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Abstract: Abstract: Abstract: Abstract:       
Tests of the semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) typically use 
earnings and book value of equity as benchmarks of fundamental value. Accounting 
earnings, however, are contaminated by noise due to their transient component and 
book value of equity tends to be biased downwards due to accounting conservatism. 
We investigate whether controlling for these effects impacts on the implications 
concerning the information efficiency of the Swedish stock market. We conclude 
that relevant adjustments increase both the magnitude and the consistency of the 
value premium earned on a contrarian investment strategy that buys (shorts) stocks 
with  low  (high)  relative  market  valuation.  The  existence  of  the  value  premium 
cannot be explained by common risk proxies or transaction costs argument. Using 
cleaner  accounting  proxies  thus  strengthens  the  evidence  on  the  imperfect 
efficiency of the Swedish stock market. 
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1.  Introduction 
The degree to which stock markets are capable of incorporating value-relevant information in 
stock  prices  is  one  of  the  most  debated  issues  in  modern  finance.  One  of  the  most 
straightforward implications of fully informative prices is that investors cannot earn excessive 
returns on publicly available information. During the past decade, researchers have argued 
that buying  (selling) stocks in companies  that have a low (high) market  value relative to 
accounting measures of fundamental values, such as earnings, cash flows, and book value of 
equity, generates high subsequent stock returns. It has been shown that investment strategies 
using  this  pattern  generate  a  substantial  value  premium  (e.g.  Lakonishok,  et  al.,  1994) 
[hereafter LSV].
1  
Despite of growing evidence on the relationship between the cross-sectional stock returns 
and  numerous  accounting  measures,  there  is  little  agreement  concerning  the  underlying 
explanation for this relationship. LSV propose an explanation based on the ‘over-reaction 
hypothesis’ that has been previously advocated by De Bondt and Thaler, 1985, De Bondt and 
Thaler, 1987 who propose that past losers outperform past winners because investors naively 
over-extrapolate a series of good (bad) news therefore over-(under-)value the winners (losers). 
                                                
1 The term value premium refers to the difference in returns on the value decile portfolio and the glamour decile 
portfolio. The term value stocks is used for companies with low market values relative to fundamentals (earnings, 
book value of equity, etc.), whereas glamour stocks is a term used for companies with high market values 
relative to fundamentals. 2 
     
Subsequently, Pettengill and Jordan, 1990 found the price reversals to be more significant for 
past losers than for past winners and they identified size as an important conditioning variable 
as the reversals are more characteristic for stock performance of large rather than small firms. 
This idea is further developed by Davidson and Dutia, 1989 who find that prior the long term 
reversal there is a short term persistence in stock prices – phenomenon that has later become 
known as ‘momentum’ Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993. LSV use this idea  and compare the 
actual  future  growth  rates  in  earnings  with  the  growth  rates  implied  in  stock  prices  and 
conclude that investors tend to over-(under-)estimate the growth prospects of glamour (value) 
stocks that leads to subsequent correction in stock prices that provides the opportunity for 
contrarian investing. This proposition is further supported by La Porta, et al., 1997 who find 
out that the abnormal returns in the post-formation period are concentrated around earnings 
announcements. In particular, they are substantially higher for value stocks than for glamour 
stock,  which  indicates  that  investors  are  consistently  surprised  by  better-than-expected 
performance of value stocks. 
An alternative explanation for the existence of value premium is advocated by Fama and 
French, 1992. They argue that ratios used for sorting stocks into portfolios (e.g. E/P, B/M) are 
correlated with an underlying risk variable that makes the values stocks fundamentally riskier, 
hence justifying the superior returns earned on them. This idea has been further developed in 
the construction of the 3-factor asset pricing model Fama and French, 1993. 
Most  of  the  initial  studies  testing  the  performance  of  contrarian  strategies  have  been 
performed on U.S. data. This created a concern that the empirical patterns may be unique to 
the U.S. market and hence not generalizable for other settings. This would have significant 
implications for their usefulness for future theory building as well as policy making. This 
concern is voiced by Conrad, et al., 2003 who propose that more than 50 per cent of the in-
sample relation between stock returns and the underlying accounting characteristics can be a 3 
     
results of data snooping, which is possible due to the familiarity of the research community 
with the characteristics of U.S. stock returns. Although the returns of modern stock exchanges 
are highly correlated (e.g. Lucey, et al., 2004), it cannot be ruled out that abnormal returns are 
randomly generated and thus that the value premium of a contrarian investment strategy (CIS) 
is largely unique to a few equity markets and the methods that have been used in past research. 
This calls for verifying the value and glamour returns patterns in different markets to provide 
out-of-sample evidence allowing us to assess the universality of these patterns. 
One  of  the  first  studies  documenting  a  relationship  between  stock  returns  and  other 
accounting-based variables is performed by Chan, et al., 1991 who use Japanese data to show 
that earnings yield, size, book to market ratio, and cash flow yield all predict future stock 
returns. Cai, 1997 elaborates on these findings by explicitly testing for the conventional risk 
proxies  and  concludes  that  they  cannot  fully  explain  the  superior  returns  on  contrarian 
investment strategies, which indicates the existence of the extrapolation bias in the Japanese 
market. One of the first European studies is performed by Brouwer and Van Der Put, 1997 
who use data pooled from France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK who confirm the 
existence of value premium in these markets. They investigate the performance of contrarian 
strategies  in  good  and  bad  states  of  the  economy  and  conclude  that  viewed  from  this 
perspective the value stocks do not appear to be riskier than glamour stocks. They conclude 
that behavioral biases of small investors coupled with incentive schemes of fund managers are 
likely to account for these patterns. Gregory, et al., 2001 use UK data to further illuminate the 
controversy  between  the  risk-based  vs.  the  overreaction-based  explanation  of  the  value 
premium. They use the 3-factor model Fama and French, 1993 and show that while it is 
capable of explaining the value premium based on one-way sorting, it fails to explain the 
difference in stock returns on two-way sorting that uses the information about future implied 
growth  alongside  with  the  information  on  past  performance  for  sorting  the  stocks  in  the 4 
     
portfolios.  Chin,  et  al.,  2002  provide  results  that  also  corroborate  with  the  overreaction 
explanation. They argue that in a less liquid market the contrarian returns should take longer 
to materialize due to lower trading volumes and less intense competition promoting the price 
corrections. Consistent with this prediction they show that in New Zealand (that is seen as an 
example of a less liquid market) the value portfolios underperform during the first year after 
formation but outperform in the subsequent periods. Similar results are reported by Forner 
and Marhuenda, 2003 who show a short-term persistence of Spanish stock returns (over 6 
months) and a long-term reversal (over 3 years). 
In this study we use Swedish data for the period between 1980 and 2004. The Stockholm 
Stock Exchange (SSE) is of interest for several reasons. First, the Scandinavian corporate 
governance system is usually described as distinct from both the Anglo-Saxon and Germanic 
corporate governance systems (La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999) in which most studies 
have been made (LSV, Brouwer and Van Der Put, 1997, Gregory, et al., 2001). This provides 
an opportunity to study the CIS in an environment with different characteristics. Second, its 
size  is  limited  (with  an  average  of  240  companies)  and  hence  we  can  ensure  that  all 
companies meeting the sample selection criteria are included. Thus, our results cannot be 
caused by any sample selection error. Third, although the SSE is a reasonably large stock 
exchange, it has not been extensively studied in the past. Given the critique by Conrad, et al. 
(2003), a study of such a stock exchange seems relevant. To the best of our knowledge, there 
are  no  established  factors  (such  as  book-to-market  or  size)  that  influence  Swedish  stock 
returns even though such patterns might exist. 
In the first part of this paper we report results obtained by implementing a strategy similar 
to the one used by LSV. Value and glamour stocks are identified using different measures of 
operating performance, namely earnings and book value of equity. The success of the trading 
strategy  depends  on  its  ability  to  earn  a  value  premium  in  the  years  following  portfolio 5 
     
formation. We calculate both average and cumulative buy-and-hold returns and then evaluate 
value  and  glamour  strategies  against  the  market  return.  This  approach  enables  us  to 
investigate whether value strategies consistently overperform or whether glamour strategies 
consistently underperform the market. While both over- and underperformance violate market 
rationality, they have different implications for minimal market rationality (Rubinstein, 2001). 
Because  short  selling  tends  to  be  restricted,  an  observed  consistent  underperformance  of 
glamour stocks does not necessarily violate minimal rationality of the market. This is because 
it is difficult (and costly) for rational arbitrageurs to drive the price back to the fundamental 
value. Conversely, persistent overperformance of value stocks cannot be easily explained by 
cost of arbitrage.  
To account for risk associated with pursuing the contrarian strategy we investigate the 
consistency of its ability to generate a value premium over time, where we explicitly control 
for risk by measuring size- and beta-adjusted abnormal returns. Furthermore, we examine the 
value premium’s dependence on economic conditions. Neither of these approaches suggests 
that risk is capable of explaining the value premium.  
One  of  the  strengths  with  the  LSV  model  is  its  simplicity,  in  that  all  non-financial 
securities are used when formulating the investment strategy. Such a simple strategy, however, 
does  not  account for  investors’  ability to  see systematic  differences  in  valuation  between 
companies. We  therefore create  investment  strategies that  consider  the accounting  bias in 
book value of equity and volatility of earnings.
2 Accounting standards allow some assets, 
typically tangible assets (such as production plants and machines) to be recognized, whereas 
other  assets,  typically  intangible  assets  (such  as  brand  names  and  patents),  remain 
unrecognized.  Similarly,  some  companies  have  volatile  earnings  and  therefore  current 
                                                
2 We denote book value of equity as B, and earnings as E throughout the text. When relating these measures to 
the share price we use the standard abbreviations B-M for the Book value of equity relative to Market value of 
equity (ie, the share price), and E-P for the Earnings to the share price (Market value of equity). 6 
     
performance measures are contaminated with a substantial transient element. Acknowledging 
this fact when forming portfolios for CIS improves the efficiency of our proxies for company 
fundamentals and hence increases the value premium.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the rationale underlying 
CIS and specifies the hypotheses that we test. Section 3 introduces the dataset and outlines the 
methodology used to compute the returns of contrarian strategies. In Section 4 we present the 
results  of  simple  contrarian  investment  strategies,  which  are  followed  by  sections  on 
transitory earnings and accounting conservatism. Section 7 summarizes and concludes. 
2. Theoretical Background and Research Hypotheses 
The ability to earn an abnormal return with the use of CIS has attracted investors’ attention 
for many years (e.g. Lefevre, 1923, Graham and Dodd, 1934). Recently, the idea to ‘buy 
when many others sell and sell when many others buy’ has been given new support, however. 
Research in behavioral finance suggests that heuristics systematically bias investor decisions 
(Hirshleifer,  2001).  Investors  might  extrapolate  past  events  too  far  into  the  future  and 
construct favorable scenarios for stocks with a glamorous past. In the past decade researchers 
have expended a considerable amount of effort trying to test these behavioral ideas (LSV, Cai, 
1997, Gregory, et al., 2001). 
To implement a CIS one has to first identify stocks, which are likely to have temporarily 
depressed prices, and then hold them for a sufficiently long time, during which other investors 
recognize that they are underpriced and correct the mispricing. This price correction then 
generates the excess return. Similarly, one might short sell overpriced stocks during a certain 
period  waiting  until  other  investors  realize  their  weak  operating  performance  and  again 
correct the mispricing. In principle, the idea is that other naïve investors in the future will be 
surprised by a company’s operating performance. 7 
     
The evidence of superior returns generated by holding value stocks instead of glamour 
stocks has increased over the years. Early studies examine the relationship between security 
prices and book  value of equity, earnings, and cash flows, providing direct evidence that 
companies with low values relative to fundamentals are better investments (LSV, Chan, et al., 
1991). Within the capital market literature, there is a vast amount of studies spanning the past 
three decades that document a relationship between variables, such as B/M, and subsequent 
stock returns (e.g. Fama and French, 1992). Although most past studies have been made with 
the use of US data, there are a few European contrarian investment studies. Gregory, et al. 
(2001) [hereafter GHM] make a comprehensive study of CIS using UK data. Their study 
includes  a  large  varied  sample  from  1975-1993.  Following  the  procedure  of  LSV,  they 
formulate both one- and two-variable classifications of value and glamour stocks based on 
past growth and future expected growth. Their contrarian strategy works very well and, in 
particular, the first year returns are high. Based on B/M, the value portfolio outperforms the 
glamour portfolio with 22.2%. These results are followed up by a second study (Gregory, et 
al., 2003) in which macroeconomic risks are considered. The conclusions from this study, 
however, are the same: value stocks outperform glamour stocks in the UK and no identifiable 
risk factor seems able to explain the pattern. Outside Anglo-Saxon stock exchanges, there is 
not  much  evidence.  Examining  a  selection  of  large  German,  Dutch,  French,  and  British 
companies Brouwer and Van Der Put, 1997 find that value strategies generate superior returns. 
There are no similar studies based on Scandinavian data. The Fama-French three-factor model, 
which  has  been tested  with  significant  results, includes  the  B/M  variable  (Asgharian  and 
Hansson, 2000). Some past studies question market efficiency (e.g. Booth, et al., 1996, Jokipii 
and Vahamaa, 2006) but none of the existing Scandinavian studies directly targets CISs. 
Based on  past research, the first task  is to examine  whether a CIS  generates superior 
returns  at  the  SSE.  Such  a  study  is  noteworthy  for  several  reasons:  (i)  many  studies  of 8 
     
corporate  governance  have  claimed  that  Scandinavian  countries  have  unique  governance 
features (e.g. La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes, 1999) that might impact the functioning of the 
equity market, (ii) the size of the market is limited and complete data exist for an extended 
period, and (iii) knowledge about existing empirical relationships between security return and 
variables,  such as beta, size,  B/M, and E/P, is scarce for the SSE. Consequently,  we are 
exploring a known phenomenon in a relatively unknown market. We formulate the following 
first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Value stocks yield higher returns than glamour stocks in the years following portfolio 
formation. 
 
Value (glamour) stocks are defined as stocks that have a high (low) market value relative to 
some proxy of fundamental value. Although not all stocks with high relative valuations need 
to  be  overvalued,  we  expect  the  overvaluation  (undervaluation)  to  be  more  frequent  in  a 
portfolio of stocks with high (low) relative market valuation. Hence, the difference in returns 
(i.e. value premium) earned on these portfolios captures the difference in relative occurrence 
of over- and undervalued stocks in value and glamour portfolios. 
According  to  past  research,  a  CIS  yields  a  significant  excess  return.  However,  this 
investment strategy is a very simple strategy in which all companies are treated equally. Such 
a strategy is convenient mainly because it is easy to implement and replicate; however, from 
an  economic  standpoint,  it  has  several  drawbacks  that  might  understate  the  strategy’s 
functionality and power. In essence, there are differences between companies concerning their 
future abnormal earnings growth capacity. Some companies have a very low (high) market 
value relative to fundamentals simply because they have a very small (large) potential to 
provide future returns above the cost of capital. In other words, for these companies the low 9 
     
(high) value is appropriate. If, for example, a steel producer is likely to face lower growth 
opportunities than a profitable medical technology company, it deserves a lower valuation. 
The steel producer would then correctly have a high B/M and E/P ratio relative to the medical 
technology company. In addition, the usefulness of operating performance measures (earnings) 
can be contaminated by annual fluctuations. We argue that investors can exploit this and 
thereby increase the return of the CIS. We adjust the accounting measures of fundamental 
value  to  make  them  more  effective  in  identifying  over-  and  undervalued  stocks  and  test 
whether  this  manipulation  leads  to  higher  value  premiums  and  improved  consistency  of 
contrarian strategies. 
First, most companies’ operating performance is, to some extent, affected by known and 
predictable factors in the business environment. Such factors, for example, are exchange rates, 
commodity prices, interest rates, and consumer demand. The extent to which the operating 
performance  is  predictable  varies  between  different  companies  and  to  a  large  extent  this 
variation is industry-related. If the level of predictability is high and investors know that the 
measure of operating performance varies substantially, current operating performance will be 
only marginally connected to future returns. For instance, consider a paper pulp producer. It 
has  high  fixed  costs  that  create  a  substantial  operating  leverage.  When  sales  prices  and 
exchange rates vary, this leverage makes earnings and operating cash flows fluctuate even 
more. Because both sales prices and exchange rates are known to investors, earnings/cash 
flows are largely transitory. Investors pay less attention to current earnings/cash flows for a 
company with predictable and volatile earnings/cash flows relative to companies acting in 
stable environments. Although this has a limited effect on the B/M measure, it greatly affects 
the E/P measure. We expect that companies experiencing large transitory earnings more often 
will be overrepresented among value stocks in good times and glamour stocks in bad times. It 
is likely that the simple CIS overlooks this fact and hence the value premium is understated. 10 
     
To provide a better benchmark of operating performance we clean the earnings of the noise 
that is due to the transient component. This leads to our second hypothesis: 
 
H2:  The  value  premium  generated  by  CIS  increases  when  the  effect  of  the  transitory 
component of performance measures is taken into account. 
 
Second, it is recognized that different companies rely on different kinds of resources; however, 
some  of  these  resources  are  less  frequently  recognized  in  the  balance  sheet.  Because  of 
accounting conservatism, accounting standards do not allow all investments to be recognized 
as assets and they are asymmetric in treating expected future losses and gains. Thus, assets are 
likely to be understated, whereas liabilities may be overstated. Consequently, the book value 
of equity tends to be understated. Typically, property, production plants, and equipment are 
capitalized  as  tangible  fixed  assets,  valued  at  historical  cost,  and  depreciated  over  the 
estimated  economic  life.  On  the  other  hand,  internally  generated  intangible  assets  are, 
according to accounting rules, recognized in the balance sheet to only a limited extent. Most 
of the costs related to the internal acquisition of resources (such as research, marketing, and 
personnel  training)  are  taken  directly  through  the  income  statement.  Companies  with  a 
substantial  amount  of  assets  unrecognized  (recognized)  under  the  existing  accounting 
principles are more likely to end up in glamour (value) portfolios when sorting on simple B/M 
multiples.  We  expect  that  companies  relying  heavily  on  unrecognized  resources  are 
overrepresented among glamour stocks and that (to some extent) companies with recognized 
resources  are  overrepresented  among  value  stocks.  If  this  is  true,  the  use  of  simple  B/M 
multiples understates the magnitude of value premium. Hence, we expect that after we adjust 
the book value of equity in B/M for the bias (due to accounting conservatism) the multiple 
will identify over- and undervalued stocks more effectively. We formulate the following third 11 
     
hypothesis: 
 
H3:  The  value  premium  generated  by  CIS  increases  when  the  effect  of  accounting 
conservatism on asset and liability recognition is taken into account. 
3. Research Design 
We  evaluate  the  contrarian  investment  strategy  using  data  from  all  companies  excluding 
banks and insurance companies quoted at the SSE between 1980 and 2004.
3 The data are 
obtained through the Trust database provided by Six Estimates. In total, we use accounting 
data  for  602  companies  producing  6 006  firm-year  observations,  i.e.  on  average  240 
observations a year (increasing over time). The companies are classified into one of nineteen 
industries based on their operations during the year. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for 
the sample. There is a general tendency for the market value of equity to increase over time, 
but there are three periods when it dips: 1984-85, 1991-93, and 2001-02. While B/M and E/P 
ratios vary over time they do not seem to be systematically affected in these periods as both 
multiples are relatively low in 1984-85, relatively high in 1991-93 and close to their median 
values in the period 2001-02. Overall, B/M and E/P ratios are lower in the early 1980s and 
1990s. The difference between value and glamour portfolios also changes over time and is 
largest in the late 1990s (not reported in Table 1). We believe that the extensive length of the 
analyzed period ensures that the results are not time specific.  
At the end of March each year, all companies are ranked based on current market value 
relative to last year’s measures of operating performance. Constructing portfolios in March 
                                                
3 As it is difficult to interpret the operating performance of banks and insurance companies using E/P and B/M, 
these companies are excluded. We also exclude companies with share price data from less than 12 months. These 
companies represent less than 0.3% of all firm-year observations. 12 
     
ensures that accounting information is available to investors at the time of portfolio formation, 
which would avoid a hindsight bias (Banz and Breen, 1986).
4 Two measures of operating 
performance are used: net earnings and book value of equity (including minority interests). 
We  exclude  companies  with  negative  earnings  from  E/P  portfolios  and  companies  with 
negative equity from the B/M portfolios because negative earnings or book value of equity are 
not representative of company fundamental value.  
The sample period is characterized with increasing stock market activity, and the number 
of companies in the value/glamour decile portfolios increases from 10 in 1982 to 23 in 2002 
(not shown specifically in the tables). Based on the ranking, ten equally-weighted portfolios 
are formed. The decile with lowest ratios (1) is referred to as the glamour portfolio and the 
decile with the highest ratios (10) is referred to as the value portfolio. 
The CIS is primarily evaluated based on the dividend-adjusted annual stock returns for 
three years following portfolio formation. Overall, the investigated period has provided high 
returns to investors. The SSE was highly oriented toward internet and telecommunication 
stocks in the late 1990s when returns were exceptionally high. Many stocks earned substantial 
negative returns in the aftermath of the sharp decrease of prices of high-tech stocks. Overall 
many stocks experienced exceptionally large value changes in the years 1997-2002. 
The analysis is based on both annual and cumulative returns. When estimating the annual 
returns, proceeds from delisted companies (if any) are reinvested in the corresponding size-
decile portfolio until the annual portfolio is rebalanced at the end of March (when all the 
stocks remaining in portfolios are again equally weighted).
5 While monthly rebalancing is 
                                                
4 Companies for which the fiscal year differs from the calendar year are included in the ranking in March of the 
year starting after the end of the fiscal year-end. This procedure ensures that there are at least three months for 
accounting data dissemination and that there are no missing observations but is likely to introduce some noise. 
Excluding these companies does not materially affect our results. 
5 We use size decile portfolio as a proxy for an investment with comparable risk characteristics. The size-
adjusted decile portfolios are formed at the end of March each year based on the market values at that time. In 13 
     
possible, we follow the procedure of LSV and utilize a long-term perspective, which also 
reduces transaction costs. Cumulative  returns are calculated somewhat differently. This  is 
because portfolios are not rebalanced each year and therefore all stocks retain the weight that 
they  have  gained through  increases or decreases  in value  during past years. If a stock  is 
delisted, its return is replaced with the return of the corresponding size decile for the rest of 
the cumulative period (which can be longer than one year). The difference between these two 
approaches can be illustrated with a simple example. When a stock doubles its value (+100%) 
in the first year following portfolio formation and then returns to its previous value in the next 
year (-50%), its cumulative return is going to be 0% while its average annual return is going 
to be +25%. The use of both annual and cumulative returns increases the understanding of the 
strategy’s ability to earn a value premium. One advantage with the cumulative returns is that 
it is suffering less from the problem with transaction costs. On the other hand, because size-
decile returns are used to replace returns of delisted companies for the rest of the three-year 
period  and  because  many  companies  might  drop  out  of  the  sample  during  this  period, 
cumulative returns can contain a substantial portion of these ‘replacement’ returns. 
The reported value premium shows the difference in returns on the value and glamour 
portfolios. This implicitly assumes a zero-investment trading strategy in which the purchase 
of value stocks is financed by the short selling of glamour stocks. However, in reality it is 
much easier for an investor to buy value stocks than to short sell glamour stocks. The CIS is 
therefore  easier  to  implement  for  value  stocks.  Hence,  we  examine  how  the  value  and 
glamour portfolios perform relative to the market, which decomposes the value premium into 
two components: value overperformance of the market and glamour underperformance of the 
market. If CISs generate excessive returns, but most of it comes from an underperformance of 
                                                                                                                                                   
line with past international research (e.g., Fama and French, 1992) we find that portfolios with small stocks tend 
to earn slightly higher returns than large stocks. Details on the returns of size-decile portfolios can be obtained 
upon request. 14 
     
the glamour portfolio, then transaction costs associated with short selling could explain why 
the phenomenon persists. It is then merely a paper product on a researcher’s desk. 
Furthermore, we perform a number of risk adjustments to determine whether the value 
premium is likely to be a compensation for higher risks associated with value stocks. After 
comparing the volatility of glamour and value portfolio returns, we explicitly control for the 
effect of established risk factors – size and CAPM beta. In addition, to account for additional 
unknown risk factors we analyze the dependence of value premium on economic conditions. 
These adjustments are described in detail in the empirical section of the paper. 
4. Simple Contrarian Investment Strategies 
Table 2 shows returns on simple CISs using decile portfolios based on E/P and B/M ranking. 
Individual columns show portfolio returns in the first, second, and third year after the time of 
formation (labeled R1, R2, and R3), then the average annual return (AR3) computed as the 
mean of annual returns in the first three years, and finally, the cumulative buy-and-hold return 
for three years after the formation of portfolios (CR3)
6. We also report (i) the zero-investment 
value  premium,  i.e.  the  difference  in  returns  earned  on  value  and  glamour  portfolios 
(portfolios 10 - 1 and the less extreme 9 - 2), (ii) the success rate of contrarian strategy and the 
standard deviations of market, glamour, and value returns, and (iii) value overperformance 
and glamour underperformance measured in relation to an equal-weighted market portfolio 
consisting of stocks excluding banks and insurance companies. 
The  results  reported  in  Table  2  support  the  hypothesis  that  value  stocks  outperform 
glamour stocks. The annual value premium for the zero-investment portfolio (10-1) is, on 
                                                
6 We have also calculated returns in the fourth and fifth year after portfolio formation. In general, the value 
premium is positive but vey small. Because we presume that  rebalancing once in three years is acceptable, even 
for for investors with very long investment horizons, we only report results for the first three years. 15 
     
average, 10.8% when using the E/P and 13.8% when using the B/M. For the cumulative buy-
and-hold  return,  this  translates  into  a  63.0%  (49.9%)  value  premium  over  the  three-year 
period based on the E/P (B/M) ratio. When considering that the average annual market return 
is 24.9%, these value premiums are, in economic terms, rather substantial. It is also evident 
that the value premium is not only concentrated to the extreme portfolios (10 and 1). While 
portfolios 9 and 2 show a lower value premium, it remains substantially positive. For E/P, the 
average value premium decreases from 10.8% to 5.1% and for B/M from 13.8% to 7.1%.
7 8 
Transaction Costs 
It is sometimes suggested that CIS may produce abnormal returns on paper, but that these are 
not  achievable  in  practice.  Substantial  transaction  costs  can  turn  any  investment  strategy 
unprofitable.  We  identify  two  potential  sources  of  these  transaction  costs:  (i)  annual 
rebalancing of portfolios and (ii) the need for short selling.  
Annual  rebalancing  ensures  that  all  surviving  stocks  in  a  portfolio  are  held  in  equal 
proportion measured in terms of their current valuation. This means that part of one’s holding 
of a stock that performed very well in year one are sold at the end of that year and the money 
obtained is used for acquiring more of those stocks that performed less well in year one (in 
order to maintain equal weighting of all stocks in terms of their market value). To investigate 
potential transaction costs from annual rebalancing  we estimate the three-year cumulative 
returns reported in Table 2. Stocks that produce substantially higher/lower returns than the 
                                                
7 To investigate the effect of outliers we also Winsorize all stock returns at 2% from each side (tables with 
Winsorized results can be obtained from the authors upon request). Winsorizing does not have a substantial 
impact  on  the  value  premium  for  raw  returns  or  for  risk-adjusted  returns.  When  considering  raw  returns, 
Winsorizing marginally increases both 10-1 and 9-2 value premiums earned on the E/P strategy to 11.0% and 
7.3%, respectively. For the B/M strategy, the 10-1 value premium decreases to 12.7%, whereas the 9-2 value 
premium increases to 7.9%. A similar pattern is generated when Winsorizing size-adjusted and CAPM beta-
adjusted returns. 
8 When keeping the observations with negative earnings in the sample, the value premium earned on the E/P 
strategy is smaller, 9.9%, for the 10-1 value premium (and reduced to 2.9% for the 9-2 value premium). This 
finding is consistent with the intuitive argument that negative earnings are not representative of a company’s 
fundamental value as they are bound to revert in the future unless the company goes bankrupt.  16 
     
rest of the stocks in a portfolio will affect cumulative returns more significantly than annual 
returns. In general, we find that cumulative returns are higher than average returns. The E/P 
(B/M)  three-year  cumulative  return  is  63.0%  (49.9%),  whereas  multiplying  the  average 
returns for three years yields a return of 35.6% (47.3%). Thus, avoiding annual rebalancing 
does not have a negative effect on the results (in fact, the return earned would be somewhat 
higher). The positive effect seems to arise because of a positive autocorrelation in returns. 
Value stocks that yield a high return in the first year tend to do so in the second and third year 
as well. Avoiding portfolio rebalancing both removes transaction costs and increases the value 
premium, but it also increases company-specific risk. 
Another  transaction  cost  argument  is  that  short  selling  of  stocks  is  so  costly  that  it 
eliminates any incentive for rational arbitrage. To determine how much of the value premium 
can be obtained without the need of short selling we split the value premium into a value 
overperformance component and a glamour underperformance component. If short  selling 
constraints are to explain the value premium, the glamour underperformance component must 
constitute most of the value premium. Results summarized in Table 2 do not support this 
reasoning.  When  comparing  with  an  equal-weighted  market  portfolio  (Rm),  the  value 
overperformance constitutes approximately one half of the value premium. This is somewhat 
less when measured in terms of average annual returns (5.0% compared with -5.7% for the 
E/P strategy and 5.2% compared with -8.6% for the B/M strategy) and it is somewhat more 
than one half when measured in terms of cumulative three-year returns (33.1% compared with 
-29.9% for the E/P strategy and 26.0% compared with -23.9% for the B/M strategy). The 
relative contribution of value overperformance is even greater for contrarian strategies using 
the combination of E/P and B/M reported in Table 6 (8.1% compared with -3.9% for average 
annual returns and 41.0% compared with -13.5% for the cumulative three-year returns). Given 
that the value overperformance of the market return on average constitutes at least one half of 17 
     
the entire value premium (depending on the measure used) the results cannot be viewed as an 
artifact of short-selling restrictions. 
Value Premium and Risk 
The greatest challenge for anyone suggesting the superiority of a CIS is to show that the 
documented  value  premium  is  not  just  an  appropriate  compensation  for  holding  a  riskier 
portfolio. It should be pointed out that no researcher can completely refute the idea that value 
stocks  are  riskier  than  glamour  stocks,  as  it  is  impossible  to  exhaust  the  universe  of  all 
possible risk factors. Hence, regardless of how comprehensive a test may be there is always a 
chance that some omitted risk factors actually make value stocks riskier. Recognizing the 
inability  to  refute  the  risk  argument  fully  we  conduct  some  typical  tests  to  give  us  an 
indication whether it is likely that the value premium exists because value stocks are riskier 
than glamour stocks.  
In  Table  2  we  report  the  success  rate  of  contrarian  strategies,  as  well  as  standard 
deviations of the market, glamour portfolio returns, and value portfolio returns. Because it 
measures the frequency with which the glamour portfolio underperforms the value portfolio, 
the success rate captures the inter-temporal consistency of the value premium. On an annual 
basis, the value portfolio outperforms the glamour portfolio in 66.5% (61.3%) of the cases for 
the  E/P  (B/M)  strategy.  When  extending  the  investment  horizon  to  three  years,  the 
consistency  improves  to  87.0%  (73.9%)  for  the  E/P  (B/M)  strategy.  Thus,  if  investors 
consistently apply the zero-investment strategy with a three-year horizon, they would find 
themselves worse off in only 3 (6) out of 23 portfolio formation years. Table 2 also shows that 
the average annual standard deviation of market returns is somewhat lower than the standard 
deviation  of  value  and  glamour  portfolio  returns  (this  is  expected  because  of  the 
diversification effect, as the market includes ten times as many stocks as compared with value 18 
     
or glamour portfolio). The standard deviation of value portfolio returns is lower for the E/P 
and higher for  the  B/M strategy  than the standard  deviation  of glamour  portfolio returns. 
However, the differences in annual standard deviations seem to be rather small in comparison 
with the difference in returns. We note that the standard deviation for cumulative returns 
differs substantially, making value stocks appear considerably more risky without an annual 
rebalancing of the portfolios. 
Next, we calculate returns with adjustments for size and CAPM beta. Table 3 shows size-
adjusted abnormal returns (SAAR) on contrarian strategies based on E/P and B/M. Stocks are 
allocated to size decile portfolios for which annual dividend-adjusted returns are computed. 
To obtain SAAR we subtract from each stock’s actual return the return of its corresponding 
size decile. Hence, SAAR shows how much individual stocks earn above/below to what is 
earned on stocks of comparable size. Table 3 shows that even though the value premium for 
size-adjusted  returns  is  lower  than  the  one  for  raw  returns  (i.e.  value  stocks  tend  to  be 
somewhat smaller and hence riskier than glamour stocks), the premium is still positive and 
substantial. In case of E/P the size adjustment reduces the average annual value premium only 
marginally from 10.8% to 10.3%. In case of B/M the value premium declines more (from 
13.8% to 9.5%). The cumulative three-year returns are reduced only marginally (from 63.0% 
to 61.6% for E/P and from 49.9% to 41.4% for B/M).  
Table 4 shows the beta-adjusted abnormal returns (BAAR) on contrarian strategies based 
on E/P and B/M. To ensure availability of normal return estimate for all stocks we estimate 
beta by regressing an individual stock’s excess return over its entire existence in the sample 
on market index excess returns.
9 To obtain BAAR from each stock’s raw return we subtract 
                                                
9 The ten-year government bond is used as a risk-free interest rate. As a proxy for expected market return, the 
geometric average of the past five-year return of AFGX (relative to the time of portfolio formation) is used. 
Several other approaches, including estimating CAPM beta based on the past 60 monthly returns relative to the 
time of portfolio formation, provide qualitatively similar results.  19 
     
the normal return of a stock estimated with the use of CAPM. Overall, Table 4 shows that 
adjusting for sensitivity of an asset return on the market return does not impact the magnitude 
of the value premium. The average annual value premium earned on E/P adjusted for CAPM 
beta  decreases  slightly  from  10.8%  to  10.2%,  whereas  the  cumulative  three-year  return 
decreases from 63.0% to 59.8%. For the B/M, the adjustment actually increases the average 
annual  value  premium  from  13.8%  to  14.5%,  whereas  the  three-year  cumulative  return 
increases from 49.9% to 52.4%. Thus, adjustments for size and beta erode only a fraction of 
the value premium (about one tenth for most of the measures). If the two commonly used risk 
factors effectively capture portfolio risk, these results suggest that value stocks are not riskier 
and hence the value premium’s existence cannot be explained by risk.  
Certainly, CAPM beta and size may fail to capture fully all dimensions of risk. In that 
case, value premiums can possibly constitute just a compensation for non-captured risk (LSV). 
However, regardless of the underlying (hidden) risk factor, if riskier, the contrarian strategies 
should perform poorly in bad states of the economy when wealth is scarcer and the marginal 
utility of consumption is high. Hence, we investigate the dependence of value premium on the 
state of the economy  by regressing  the  value premium and  its components  on proxies  of 
economic conditions – Swedish stock market index (AFGX) and Swedish GDP growth. The 
risk-related  explanation  predicts  a  positive  relationship  between  the  value  premium  and 
AFGX  and  between  the  value  premium  and  GDP  growth.  On  the  contrary,  if  the  value 
premium  is  a  result  of  a  market  correction  to  previously  generated  mispricing,  one  can 
anticipate a negative relation between the value premium and the economic conditions. This is 
anticipated because we expect value stocks to be less sensitive to market conditions than 
glamour stocks. During favorable economic conditions, the correction of overvalued (glamour) 
stocks  may  be  postponed  as  the  inadequacy  of  a  high  valuation  becomes  less  apparent. 
Conversely,  when  the  economic  conditions  are  poor  and  the  stock  market  is  weak,  the 20 
     
overvaluation  quickly  becomes  evident.  Therefore,  if  correction  of  mispricing  were  the 
underlying  reason  for  the  existence  of  value  premium,  one  would  expect  the  contrarian 
strategies  to  work  particularly  well  when  the  economy  is  weak:  hence,  a  negative 
hypothesized relation between value premium and stock market return and between value 
premium and GDP growth. 
Panel B in Table 5 presents the results from the regression of the value premium on the 
AFGX return. Even though none of the slope coefficients is significant at the 5% level, most 
of them are negative (with the exception of the 10-1 value premium based on the B/M sorting), 
with some approaching the cut-off for negative significance. The results from the regression 
of the value premium on GDP growth are given in Panel C in Table 5. All slope coefficients 
are negative and with insignificant t-stats ranging from -0.494 for the (10-1) value premium 
for the B/M strategy to -1.591 for the (10-1) value premium for the E/P strategy. Hence, it 
seems unlikely that the value premium is caused by some hidden economy-related risk factor 
because the relationship of value premium (both to stock market return and to GDP growth) is, 
if anything, slightly negative. 
Value Premium over Time 
Next, we analyze changes in the value premium over time. Few inferences useful for future 
investing and for assessment of stock market efficiency can be drawn from our findings in 
case the value premium has significantly declined over time, possibly because of investors 
becoming increasingly aware of its existence and trading on it.
 10 Hence, we regress the value 
premiums and their components on a time variable. The unadjusted results presented in Panel 
D of Table 5 indicate that the AFGX return, the E/P value premium, and the B/M value 
premium have all decreased over time (although with statistically insignificant coefficients). 
                                                
10 We thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this aspect. 21 
     
However, closer inspection reveals that these results are severely affected by extremely high 
returns and value premiums in the early 1980s and extremely low returns and value premiums 
around the year 2000 (the time of an unusually high valuation and a subsequent sharp decline 
of high-tech stocks). A removal of all years that are more than 1.5 standard deviations away 
from  their  sample  mean  (marked  with  an  asterisk  in  Table  5)  renders  all  coefficients 
insignificant. The t-statistic of the 10-1 premium earned on the E/P strategy is insignificantly 
negative, whereas the t-statistic on the other three value premiums (9-2 for E/P and 10-1 and 
9-2 for B/M) are insignificantly positive. Our interpretation is that there is no support for the 
idea that value premiums decrease over time.  
Furthermore, removing outliers does not systematically affect the mean value premium in 
that the 10-1 premium increases for the E/P strategy from 11.2% to 13.6% and decreases for 
the B/M strategy from 11.9% to 8.1% and the 9-2 premium increases substantially for both 
E/P and B/M measures (Panel A of Table 5). Hence, our conclusions regarding the existence 
of value premiums are robust to the removal to unusual years. 
Combined Contrarian Strategies 
In this subsection we report results on contrarian strategies that sort the stocks on both E/P 
and B/M. By combining the two measures, we conduct a ‘broader’ screening that also allows 
for a comparison with LSV. First, we sort all the stocks existing at a given time of portfolio 
formation to terciles based on E/P and subsequently sub-sort each terciles into three sub-
terciles based on B/M. We label the nine resulting portfolios as 11, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32, 
and 33, with the first digit denoting the E/P tercile and the second digit the B/M sub-tercile (in 
terciles 1 we expect a higher occurrence of glamour stocks, whereas value stocks should be 
concentrated in tercile 3). We compute the value premium as the difference in returns on 
value portfolio 33 (that contains stocks classified as value for both the E/P and B/M measures) 22 
     
and glamour portfolio 11. None of the other portfolios is considered in the analysis. 
Results for the combined contrarian strategy reported in Table 6 generally show the same 
pattern  as  the  individual  CIS.  In  the  first  three  years  after  portfolio  formation  the  zero-
investment  portfolio  earns  an  average  annual  value  premium  of  12.0%.  The  three-year 
cumulative value premium is 54.5%. These returns are not surprising as they fall between the 
returns on the simple E/P and simple B/M strategy. However, the success rate for the average 
annual returns increases marginally (to 68.1%) and the value overperformance component 
constitutes a higher portion of the entire value premium (68%). Hence, the excess returns may 
be easier to obtain in practice in that they require less short selling. 
5. Transitory Earnings 
In this and the following section we extend the design of contrarian strategies by adjusting for 
two issues that contaminate our proxies of accounting fundamentals. First we control for noise 
in earnings that is caused by the transient component and in the next section we adjust for the 
bias in book value of equity that is caused by accounting conservatism. We test whether the 
enhanced  measures  are  more  effective  in  identifying  under-  and  overvalued  stocks,  and 
consequently, whether they lead to a larger value premium earned more consistently. To avoid 
confusion about various benchmarks all results are reported in a condensed form showing the 
incremental value premiums and incremental success rates. These are the differences in the 
respective measures obtained by the enhanced strategy and a corresponding benchmark. 
We  decompose  earnings  into  a  permanent  and  a  transitory  component.  While  the 
permanent  component constitutes the earnings, the company  is expected to  sustain in the 
future; in contrast, the transient component reflects annual idiosyncratic effects on earnings 
unrelated  to  a  company’s  fundamental  value.  When  earnings  are  stable,  the  transient 
component is of lesser importance. Hence, we first run contrarian strategies separately for 23 
     
industries/companies  with  stable  and  volatile  earnings  to  confirm  the  relevance  of  our 
transitory earnings idea. Subsequently, we directly estimate the sustainable earnings (sE) that 
are free from noise, which is caused by the transient earnings component, and we examine the 
performance of contrarian strategies based on this measure. 
Stable and Volatile Industries 
Initially, we test whether an E/P-based CIS works better for industries with stable earnings. 
When  earnings  are  inter-temporally  stable,  the  transient  component  of  earnings  is  less 
prominent, and consequently, current earnings are more indicative of future earnings. Because 
the E/P measure should be more effective in isolating the over- and undervalued companies, 
we expect that the value premium is higher within industries with stable earnings.  
For  each  industry,  we  compute  the  median  industry  earnings  coefficient  of  variation 
(md(iECV)) based on the earnings coefficient of variation for individual companies. Table 7 
shows md(iECV), which varies from 0.660 for chemicals to 2.061 for services (excluding IT 
and  consulting).  Based  on  md(iECV),  the  industries  are  placed  into  two  groups.  Table  8 
presents the  results  of  the contrarian  strategy  performed  on  the  sub-sample  of companies 
belonging to stable industries (Panel A) and on the sub-sample of companies in industries 
with volatile earnings (Panel B).  
The results clearly support the above-stated proposition. The average incremental value 
premium for the extreme portfolios 10-1 is positive for stable industries (+4.2%) and negative 
for volatile industries (-7.5%). Furthermore, the incremental success rate is positive for stable 
industries (+5.7%) and negative for volatile industries (-12.5%). This observation means that 
when performed within a sub-sample of stable (volatile) industries, contrarian strategies earn 
a higher (lower) value premium of 15.0% (3.3%) at a higher (lower) degree of consistency in 
comparison with the benchmark of 10.8% that is obtained by pooling all industries. These 24 
     
results clearly suggest that volatility of earnings impairs the ability of earnings to serve as a 
proxy for fundamental value. When earnings are volatile, the relevant sustainable component 
is obscured with noise, which makes the sorting on E/P less effective in separating over- and 
undervalued stocks and reduces the magnitude and consistency of value premium. 
Volatile earnings indicate the presence of a substantial transient component in earnings. If 
the transient component is not identifiable, it creates noise that impairs earnings ability to 
proxy for fundamental value. However, if the transient component is pegged to the business 
cycle, it is relatively easily separable, even though it may be quite large. In these industries 
earnings  tend  to  be  volatile  but,  depending  on  the  business  cycle  phase,  the  transient 
component is systematically high or low and hence the sustainable earnings can be isolated. 
We  therefore  refine  the  analysis  by  sub-dividing  the  volatile  half of industries  into  those 
pegged to the business cycle (raw materials, forestry, and transportation) and the rest. Panel C 
of Table 8 shows that after sub-sorting separately within cyclical industries, the incremental 
10-1 value premium for volatile industries improves from -7.5% to -4.1% and the incremental 
success  rate  improves  from  -12.5%  to  -6.8%.  Thus,  when  earnings  are  volatile,  treating 
cyclical industries separately generates a higher and more consistent value premium. 
Taken together, these results highlight the importance of distinguishing the sustainable 
component of earnings from the transient one. For industries with a large transient component 
in earnings (i.e. industries with volatile earnings), the value premium earned is smaller and 
less consistent in comparison with all industries. Furthermore, if the transient component is 
large but relatively easily separable (as it is in cyclical industries), both the incremental value 
premium and the incremental success rate improve somewhat. This observation suggests that 
the transitory component of earnings is relevant for the effectiveness of contrarian strategies. 25 
     
Investment strategy based on historical earnings volatility 
Even though the previous analysis provides insights into the effect earnings quality has on the 
E/P-based CIS, it has a limited usefulness for investors. Because we purposely introduced 
hindsight  bias  when  we  used  earnings  volatility  data  from  the  entire  sample  period  for 
computing earnings volatility. Unless the ‘nature’ of industries were common knowledge, the 
strategy is infeasible because investors in the past did not have sufficient information. Now 
we use the same strategy but based on information available at the time of portfolio formation.  
We compute the coefficient of variation for each company based on the past five years of 
earnings (requiring at least three available observations). At each formation time, we divide 
the companies into halves according to their historical earnings volatility and then perform the 
contrarian strategy within each half. Table 9 shows that even though both the incremental 
value  premiums  and  the  incremental  success  rates  are  smaller  in  magnitude,  the  pattern 
documented  for  stable  and  volatile  industries  remains  unchanged.  The  incremental  value 
premium for firms with historically stable earnings is +2.3%, whereas it is -3.1% for firms 
with  volatile  earnings.  Furthermore,  the  incremental  success  rate  is  +9.4%  for  stable 
companies and -4.4% for volatile companies. These results are consistent with our previous 
conclusion  that  the  stability  of  earnings  is  relevant  for  the  effectiveness  of  contrarian 
strategies.   
Sustainable Earnings 
Building on our previous conclusion that adjusting for transience of earnings is crucial for the 
effectiveness of contrarian strategies, we now isolate a sustainable component of earnings (sE) 
and use it rather than plain earnings as a proxy for a company’s fundamentals. We use two 
methods to estimate sE. For every year, we calculate for each company the average return on 
assets for the past five years (minimum three years). We then obtain sE by multiplying the 26 
     
average  historical  company  return  on  assets  mn(cROA)  by  the  company’s  total  assets. 
Subsequently, we construct a ratio of sustainable earnings to market value of equity (sE/P) 
that is used in our CIS. The second method uses the historical mean for the past five years of 
industry median return on assets (calculated in cross-section every year) mn(iROA) multiplied 
by an individual company’s assets.  
In Table 10 we report the results for a CIS based on sustainable earnings (sE/P). Panel 
A, in  which sE  are estimated based  on mn(cROA), shows  that using sustainable earnings 
instead of plain earnings not only increases the average annual value premium by 2.1% but 
also improves the consistency of the strategy (the incremental success rate is +3.7%). Note 
that this incremental premium earned on the entire sample is comparable with the incremental 
premium on stable companies (+2.2%). Panel B shows that these results can be even further 
improved by using an industry-based (rather than company-based) return on assets mn(iROA): 
the incremental value premium is +2.7% and the incremental success rate is +11.0%. 
We conclude that distinguishing between the sustainable and transient components of 
earnings  increases  the  value  premium  earned  on  contrarian  strategies  and  increases  the 
consistency of producing positive value premiums. With the use of a simple technique to 
estimate the sustainable component of earnings for all stocks in the sample, one may produce 
value  premium  comparable  with  the  one  earned  on  the  sub-sample  of  stocks  with  stable 
earnings (where the transient component of earnings is less significant). 
6. Accounting Conservatism 
Next, we test if the value premium generated by CIS increases when the effect of accounting 
conservatism on asset and liability recognition is taken into account. Although accounting 
conservatism  affects  all  companies  to  some  extent,  companies  whose  future  performance 
largely relies on intangible assets are more affected. Overall, our method resembles the one 27 
     
used for extending the E/P-based CIS. First, we explore the B/M-based investment strategy by 
constructing portfolios that include foresight and then evaluate strategies that can easily be 
implemented by investors. 
To identify the normal levels of B/M for individual companies reflecting the typical bias 
in B that is due to accounting conservatism relevant for each company, we make use of both a 
cross-sectional  industry  and  a  time-series  analysis.  We  assume  that  the  impact  of  the 
accounting bias is similar within industries (mainly because of similar asset structures) and 
that it does not change substantially over time. Thus, averaging across the two dimensions 
removes most of the effect of mispricing on B/M and excludes the effect of accounting bias. 
In particular,  averaging within industries eliminates the effect  of mispricing  of individual 
companies.  Averaging  across  time  eliminates  the  impact  of  temporary  industry-wide 
mispricing. 
Industry Levels of B/M over the Entire Sample Period 
We compute the median book-to-market ratio md(i(B/M)) for each industry across the whole 
period. Table 11 shows md(i(B/M)) for individual industries, which varies from 0.293 for 
high-tech  development  to  0.928  for  transportation.  These  industries  are  divided  into  two 
roughly equal parts (as shown in Table 11) and we sort the companies into decile portfolios 
separately within each group. If companies within each industry are homogenously affected 
by accounting conservatism, sorting separately within these groups should partially control 
for the effect of accounting conservatism on company B/M and hence highlight the effect of 
mispricing on B/M. This procedure should make the identification of under- and overvalued 
stocks more effective. 
Table  12  shows  that  pre-sorting  on  md(i(B/M))  improves  the  performance  of 
contrarian strategies. The incremental average annual value premium is +3.3%, which means 28 
     
that the value portfolio outperforms, on average, the glamour portfolio by 17.1%. The positive 
incremental success rate of 9.7% implies that the consistency in producing positive value 
premium over time also increases. It should be noted, however, that because this investment 
strategy requires information on B/M values from the whole sample period, it is not feasible 
unless the typical level of unrecognized assets in individual industries is common knowledge 
to investors. Nevertheless, it does indicate the extent to which the effect of accounting bias in 
B/M contaminates  the results of  the initial strategy reported  in Table 2.  In the following 
subsection we attempt to capture the benefits of the adjustment for the typical level of B/M 
using only information available at the time of portfolio formation. 
Historical Industry Levels of B/M 
To  avoid  hindsight  bias  we  divide  companies  into  groups  according  to  historical  mean 
industry book-to-market ratio mn(i(B/M)) based on the date from the past five years preceding 
the time of portfolio formation. We report the incremental value premium generated by this 
strategy in Table 13. The incremental value premium averaged over the three holding years is 
not more than +0.5%. The increase in success rate is also very small (+1.4%). Although these 
results indicate that it might be possible to enhance the performance of B/M-based contrarian 
strategies with the use of historical information, the improvement is economically marginal. 
The reason for this is that using only historical mn(i(B/M)) from a short period introduces 
noise that disturbs our measure and deteriorates the return. Using only five years of time from 
the industry does not fully capture the typical effect of accounting conservatism on B/M.  
Unbiased Book Value of Equity 
The results presented so far suggest that the varying level of accounting bias in the book value 
of equity impedes its ability to proxy for fundamental value and therefore contaminates B/M 
as an indicator of market mispricing. In this subsection we explicitly adjust for the level of 29 
     
accounting conservatism in book value of equity based on industry estimates of the permanent 
measurement  bias  (PMB)  for  Swedish  quoted  companies.  Runsten  (1998)  classifies  all 
companies at the SSE into industries and then estimates the level of accounting bias affecting 
their book value of equity. He suggests that the PMB arises because of (1) unrecognized 
assets, (2) hidden reserves that create an understatement of company assets, and (3) deferred 
tax liabilities that result in overstated liabilities. Whereas the first factor is an issue in most 
countries, the last two factors are somewhat peculiar to the Swedish accounting system. We 
use PMB to compute the ‘unbiased’ book value of equity (uB) by multiplying the book value 
of equity by (1 + PMB). Furthermore, we use ratio uB/M for sorting companies into decile 
portfolios.  We  expect  that  uB  is  superior  to  simple  B  in  capturing  the  level  of  company 
fundamentals and therefore uB/M is more effective than B/M in identifying mispriced stocks. 
Panel A of Table 14 shows Runsten’s industry classification (Runsten, 1998, p. 153) and 
the  PMB  for  each  industry.  As  expected,  the  highest  level  of  estimated  bias  is  found  in 
pharmaceuticals (1.74) and the lowest for conglomerates (0.28) with a median value of 0.58. 
Panel B shows the matching of industry classifications.  
Table 15 summarizes the results for the contrarian strategies when portfolios are sorted 
applying uB/M. We can see that the uB/M strategy generates a positive incremental value 
premium of +1.7% and that the success rate slightly increases with +2.8%. Although these 
results are consistent with our predictions, they are smaller in magnitude than the ones for 
sE/P strategy, suggesting that adjusting for the accounting bias in book value of equity is 
more  problematic  than  estimating  the  level  of  permanent  earnings.  We  find  this  rather 
intuitive considering that the book value captures the cumulative effects of economic events 
occurring  over  the  entire existence  of a company,  whereas  earnings  are affected  only  by 
factors relating to a given accounting period. 30 
     
7. Summary and Conclusions 
This  study  investigates  whether  CISs  that  buy  stocks  with  a  low  stock  price  relative  to 
measures of fundamental value and short sell stocks with high relative market valuation earn a 
positive value premium. Furthermore, we examine if adjusting for transience of earnings and 
for an accounting bias in book value of equity affects the magnitude and consistency of value 
premium. It is first shown that the CIS is capable of producing excess returns. The average 
annual value premium in the first three years after portfolio formation is 10.8% and 13.8% for 
strategies based on E/P and B/M, respectively. Accordingly, the value premium is about one-
half the annual return of the market, which we deem economically significant. It is also shown 
that the value premium has not decreased over time. The value premium’s persistence is not 
likely to be explained by transaction costs because a substantial excess return can be earned 
without any short selling and with portfolio rebalancing once in three years. Considering risk, 
we use two commonly recognized risk proxies (size and CAPM beta) to directly control for 
risk of individual portfolios. These adjustments reduce the magnitude of value premiums only 
marginally.  Furthermore,  we  report  that  the  correlation  between  value  premiums  and 
economic conditions is slightly negative, which makes it unlikely for the value premiums to 
arise  because  of  some  unknown  risk  factor  unrelated  to  CAPM  beta  or  size.  Thus,  we 
conclude  that  the  use  of  earnings  and  book  value  of  equity  as  proxies  of  company 
fundamentals is effective in isolating under- and overvalued companies. 
Subsequently,  we  document  that  the  average  return  and  consistency  of  contrarian 
strategies  can  be  improved  by  adjusting  for  transitory  earnings  and  for  a  bias  caused  by 
accounting conservatism. We show that contrarian strategies  produce  positive incremental 
value  premiums  that  are  more  consistent over  time  when  we  use only  the  sub-sample  of 
companies  stable  with  stable  earnings  that  are  characterized  by  less  noise  because  of 
transience of earnings. We also show that if the volatile earnings are predictable, pre-sorting 31 
     
on predictability produces relatively higher and more consistent value premiums. Interpreting 
these results as confirming the significance of transience of earnings, we directly estimate the 
sustainable component of earnings. Sorting the entire sample based on a measure relating 
sustainable earnings to market value produces value premium comparable with the one earned 
when using plain earnings within the stable half of companies. 
Finally,  we  find  that  controlling  for  the  accounting  bias  in  book  value  improves  the 
capacity of B/M to identify under- and overvalued stocks. When we pre-sort the sample on 
the average industry B/M and subsequently form decile portfolios separately within each of 
the pre-sorted halves, the value premium as well as its consistency increases. This gives an 
indication  about  how  severely  the company  B/M  is  affected  by  accounting  conservatism. 
Thereafter, we estimate the ‘unbiased’ book value of equity and conduct a contrarian strategy 
that produces better results regarding the magnitude and consistency of value premium. 
In sum, strategies based on refined measures of company fundamentals are shown to be 
generally superior to the simple strategies using unadjusted accounting figures. However, we 
find that the improvement of E/P-based strategies (i.e. controlling for transience of earnings) 
is larger and more consistent than the improvement of B/M-based strategies (i.e. controlling 
for the accounting bias in book value of equity). This suggests that estimating the level of 
permanent earnings is relatively easier than estimating the level of unbiased book value of 
equity.  Therefore,  we  expect  that  designing  procedures  that  are  more  sophisticated  for 
cleaning the accounting bias out of the book value of equity may further improve the premium 
and consistency of B/M-based CIS. 
The  value  premium  that  can  be  earned  on  CIS  is  a  puzzling  phenomenon  for  both 
researchers and  practitioners. Additional to  the transaction cost  and risk  arguments, some 
researchers  point  to  behavioral  biases.  Lakonishok,  et  al.  (1994)  argue  that  there  is  an 
excessive  extrapolation  of  past  success/failure  into  the  future.  Their  line  of  reasoning, 32 
     
however, has been challenged by later research (e.g. Dechow and Sloan, 1997). Although we 
try to avoid theoretical explanations, the empirical data show that CISs produce high returns. 
Value/glamour stocks are often mispriced in the short run; yet, there is no doubt that the 
market then corrects itself in two to three years time. During this period, it is possible to earn 
systematic excess returns.  33 




Year  N  E  B  M  ROE  E/P  B/M 
Median Values for Individual Years 
1979  122  11.7  130.5  161.6  10.6%  0.084  0.917 
1980  163  7.3  92.3  202.1  9.0%  0.066  0.737 
1981  204  6.3  73.0  316.0  12.9%  0.069  0.622 
1982  233  6.2  62.7  525.6  12.0%  0.037  0.374 
1983  257  6.7  85.0  560.9  10.3%  0.027  0.289 
1984  282  5.7  90.1  261.9  9.1%  0.036  0.436 
1985  286  6.5  87.4  306.0  9.9%  0.039  0.384 
1986  277  9.9  112.2  429.0  11.5%  0.036  0.287 
1987  262  14.8  129.7  405.0  13.1%  0.049  0.345 
1988  245  20.0  173.1  574.3  14.0%  0.043  0.296 
1989  242  26.2  214.6  687.2  15.0%  0.057  0.370 
1990  224  18.3  234.7  409.5  10.8%  0.064  0.555 
1991  203  6.4  301.7  298.8  4.7%  0.064  0.881 
1992  196  -0.3  341.8  256.7  0.2%  0.056  1.080 
1993  211  15.9  372.8  583.6  7.2%  0.062  0.626 
1994  206  38.0  415.1  549.2  14.4%  0.083  0.688 
1995  213  44.2  492.2  676.8  14.6%  0.097  0.766 
1996  201  49.1  612.2  1 244.5  11.3%  0.056  0.472 
1997  234  45.1  475.2  1 166.8  11.3%  0.054  0.437 
1998  252  40.8  426.7  789.8  11.1%  0.069  0.568 
1999  260  35.8  395.1  1 145.3  10.1%  0.058  0.382 
2000  264  35.8  492.1  763.4  9.2%  0.085  0.626 
2001  256  6.7  422.9  693.6  2.1%  0.057  0.579 
2002  244  2.3  387.6  376.6  1.8%  0.076  0.884 
2003  233  10.1  341.9  741.4  5.1%  0.054  0.471 
2004  227  30.1  402.0  999.1  10.1%  0.053  0.393 
2005  9  112.0  460.0    12.6%     
total  6006             
               
Entire Sample Period 
median    15.2  239.0  576.4  10.2%  0.055  0.487 
quartile 1    1.0  65.0  192.2  2.5%  0.028  0.285 
quartile 3    92.2  929.7  2 243.9  18.2%  0.090  0.801 
 
Notes: 
Descriptive statistics showing annual averages of key variables for all stocks in the sample as well as 
quartile values for the entire sample period. N is the number of observations in each year (note: the 
values for 2005 arise because of irregular accounting periods ending in the beginning of 2005; these 
observations are not used for the analysis). E denotes company earnings and B the book value of 
equity of the corresponding accounting year (both in million SEK). M is the market value of equity at 
the end of March following the accounting year (i.e. the market value that is matched with the book 
value of equity in B/M). ROE denotes the return on shareholders’ equity computed as a ratio of the end 
of the year’s earnings and book value of equity (i.e. ROE = E/B). E/P and B/M are the earnings-to-
price  and  book-to-market  ratio  multiples,  respectively,  used  for  sorting  companies  into  decile 34 
     
portfolios. They are constructed by matching accounting value of a corresponding accounting period 
with the market value of equity at the end of March following the accounting year. 35 
     
Table 2 
Simple Contrarian Strategies 
 
            E/P                 B/M       
      R1  R2  R3  AR3  CR3     R1  R2  R3  AR3  CR3 
Raw Returns on Simple Contrarian Strategies 
glamour  1  21.6%  13.5%  22.4%  19.2%  52.7%    20.8%  13.3%  14.9%  16.3%  58.7% 
  2  26.2%  27.6%  15.8%  23.2%  81.3%    25.2%  23.2%  16.8%  21.7%  65.2% 
  3  22.4%  19.6%  22.2%  21.4%  80.1%    24.3%  19.8%  28.8%  24.3%  84.4% 
  4  21.1%  20.4%  21.5%  21.0%  73.4%    23.5%  21.4%  19.7%  21.5%  75.0% 
  5  23.1%  24.3%  29.4%  25.6%  98.5%    21.4%  27.0%  24.2%  24.2%  71.6% 
  6  22.1%  22.4%  25.6%  23.4%  82.6%    26.5%  25.6%  23.7%  25.3%  87.3% 
  7  24.4%  25.7%  24.0%  24.7%  81.8%    27.9%  29.3%  28.8%  28.7%  97.3% 
  8  27.7%  25.5%  29.1%  27.4%  96.8%    26.7%  27.1%  24.3%  26.1%  88.8% 
  9  31.7%  28.3%  25.0%  28.3%  101.1%    28.9%  29.9%  27.9%  28.9%  103.6% 
value  10  32.8%  29.1%  27.9%  29.9%  115.7%    32.6%  27.0%  30.7%  30.1%  108.6% 
10 - 1    11.2%  15.6%  5.5%  10.8%  63.0%    11.9%  13.7%  15.8%  13.8%  49.9% 
9 - 2    5.5%  0.7%  9.2%  5.1%  19.8%    3.6%  6.6%  11.1%  7.1%  38.4% 
success rate    68.0%  75.0%  56.5%  66.5%  87.0%    56.0%  58.3%  69.6%  61.3%  73.9% 
market std.dev.    40.9%  41.4%  42.3%  41.5%  89.0%    40.9%  41.4%  42.3%  41.5%  89.0% 
glamour std.dev.    52.3%  42.1%  47.9%  47.4%  71.6%    43.7%  42.1%  42.0%  42.6%  79.2% 
value std.dev.    42.9%  46.4%  42.6%  43.9%  130.2%    50.6%  44.1%  45.8%  46.8%  116.8% 
Rm    25.8%  24.7%  24.2%  24.9%  82.6%    25.8%  24.7%  24.2%  24.9%  82.6% 
glamour underperformance  -4,2%  -11.2%  -1.8%  -5.7%  -29.9%    -5.0%  -11.4%  -9.3%  -8.6%  -23.9% 
value outperformance    7.1%  4.4%  3.6%  5.0%  33.1%    6.9%  2.3%  6.5%  5.2%  26.0% 
 
Notes: 
Raw returns on simple CIS for 10 decile portfolios based on earnings-to-price ratio (E/P) and book-to-market ratio (B/M). R1, R2, and R3 are annual returns in 
the first, second, and third year after portfolio formation. AR3 is the average annual return (assuming annual portfolio rebalancing) for three years after the 36 
     
portfolio formation. CR3 shows the cumulative buy-and-hold return for three years after the portfolio formation. Rows 1 to 10 show the returns on individual 
decile portfolios. 10-1 and 9-2 show the value premium computed as returns on zero-investment consisting of short selling glamour portfolio 1 or 2 respectively 
and buying value portfolio 10 or 9 respectively. Success rate gives the annual frequency with which value portfolio 10 outperforms glamour portfolio 1, i.e. the 
proportion of years when the 10-1 value premium is positive. Market std.dev., glamour std.dev. and value std.dev. show standard deviation of returns for the 
market and for portfolios 1 and 10. Rm is the market return. Glamour underperformance (value outperformance) show the components of the value premium 




     
Table 3 
Size-Adjusted Contrarian Strategies 
 
            E/P                 B/M       
      R1  R2  R3  AR3  CR3     R1  R2  R3  AR3  CR3 
Size-Adjusted Returns on Simple Contrarian Strategies (SAAR) 
glamour  1  -3.9%  -9.6%  -0.4%  -4.6%  -24.7%    -2.4%  -8.0%  -7.3%  -5.9%  -15.6% 
  2  2.9%  3.4%  -8.4%  -0.7%  3.6%    1.1%  -0.5%  -4.8%  -1.4%  -10.1% 
  3  -1.6%  -0.6%  -1.2%  -1.1%  5.8%    -0.1%  -2.7%  3.8%  0.3%  5.2% 
  4  -3.0%  -2.3%  -0.8%  -2.0%  -5.0%    -0.4%  -1.6%  -4.0%  -2.0%  -2.0% 
  5  0.4%  1.2%  7.0%  2.9%  21.6%    -2.9%  1.3%  0.0%  -0.5%  -7.9% 
  6  -2.1%  -1.2%  3.5%  0.1%  5.9%    0.7%  2.4%  1.0%  1.3%  8.6% 
  7  3.0%  1.8%  -0.2%  1.5%  5.3%    1.7%  4.0%  4.4%  3.4%  16.8% 
  8  5.7%  1.8%  4.3%  4.0%  20.0%    1.9%  1.4%  0.4%  1.2%  9.6% 
  9  5.5%  3.4%  2.0%  3.6%  20.8%    2.3%  4.5%  2.3%  3.0%  22.5% 
value  10  8.1%  5.1%  3.8%  5.7%  36.9%    4.9%  0.8%  5.1%  3.6%  25.8% 
10 - 1    12.0%  14.7%  4.2%  10.3%  61.6%    7.2%  8.9%  12.4%  9.5%  41.4% 
9 - 2    2.6%  0.0%  10.4%  4.3%  17.3%    1.2%  5.0%  7.1%  4.4%  32.6% 
success rate    76.0%  75.0%  56.5%  69.2%  87.0%    52.0%  54.2%  69.6%  58.6%  73.9% 
market std.dev.    40.9%  41.4%  42.3%  41.5%  89.0%    40.9%  41.4%  42.3%  41.5%  89.0% 
glamour std.dev.    24.7%  12.2%  19.4%  18.7%  36.2%    26.0%  15.9%  17.4%  19.8%  37.2% 
value std.dev.    22.1%  17.7%  15.1%  18.3%  59.5%    24.9%  23.5%  20.8%  23.1%  56.9% 
Rm    25.8%  24.7%  24.2%  24.9%  82.6%    25.8%  24.7%  24.2%  24.9%  82.6% 
glamour underperformance  -29,6%  -34.3%  -24.7%  -29.5% 
-
107.2%    -28.1%  -32.7%  -31.6%  -30.8%  -98.1% 
value outperformance    -17.6%  -19.6%  -20.4%  -19.2%  -45.7%    -20.9%  -23.9%  -19.1%  -21.3%  -56.8% 
 
Notes: 
Size-adjusted abnormal returns on simple CIS for 10 decile portfolios based on earnings-to-price ratio (E/P) and book-to-market ratio (B/M). Size-adjusted 38 
     
abnormal returns are obtained as a difference between raw returns on a stock and the raw return on its corresponding size-decile. R1, R2, and R3 are annual 
returns in the first, second and third year after portfolio formation. AR3 is the average annual return (assuming annual portfolio rebalancing) for three years after 
the portfolio formation. CR3 shows the cumulative buy-and-hold return for three years after the portfolio formation. Rows 1 to 10 show the returns on individual 
decile portfolios. 10-1 and 9-2 show the value premium computed as returns on zero-investment consisting of short selling glamour portfolio 1 or 2 respectively 
and buying value portfolio 10 or 9 respectively. Success rate gives the annual frequency with which value portfolio 10 outperforms glamour portfolio 1, i.e. the 
proportion of years when the 10-1 value premium is positive. Market std.dev., glamour std.dev. and value std.dev. show standard deviation of returns for the 
market and for portfolios 1 and 10. Rm is the market return. Glamour underperformance (value outperformance) show the components of the value premium 
computed as the difference between the return on value portfolio 10 (glamour portfolio 1) and market return. 
 39 
     
Table 4 
Beta-Adjusted Contrarian Strategies 
 
            E/P                 B/M       
      R1  R2  R3  AR3  CR3     R1  R2  R3  AR3  CR3 
Beta-Adjusted Returns on Simple Contrarian Strategies (BAAR) 
glamour  1  2.0%  -4.9%  5.0%  0.7%  -22.3%    0.5%  -5.8%  -2.9%  -2.7%  -19.7% 
  2  6.3%  8.8%  -1.7%  4.5%  5.3%    5.5%  5.1%  -0.2%  3.5%  -9.4% 
  3  3.3%  1.4%  4.9%  3.2%  6.1%    5.1%  1.4%  11.4%  6.0%  9.6% 
  4  3.2%  3.1%  4.9%  3.7%  4.7%    4.4%  3.1%  2.3%  3.2%  1.3% 
  5  4.5%  6.5%  12.6%  7.9%  27.1%    3.2%  9.5%  7.3%  6.6%  0.3% 
  6  4.2%  5.0%  8.6%  5.9%  12.8%    8.3%  8.2%  6.5%  7.7%  16.8% 
  7  5.9%  7.9%  6.8%  6.9%  9.7%    9.4%  11.2%  11.3%  10.6%  24.1% 
  8  9.3%  7.6%  12.1%  9.7%  25.1%    7.8%  9.0%  7.2%  8.0%  15.0% 
  9  12.9%  10.2%  7.5%  10.2%  27.4%    10.1%  11.9%  10.6%  10.9%  30.1% 
value  10  13.4%  10.0%  9.3%  10.9%  37.4%    13.3%  8.7%  13.2%  11.7%  32.6% 
10 - 1    11.4%  14.9%  4.3%  10.2%  59.8%    12.8%  14.5%  16.0%  14.5%  52.4% 
9 - 2    6.5%  1.3%  9.2%  5.7%  22.1%    4.6%  6.8%  10.8%  7.4%  39.5% 
success rate    68.0%  70.8%  52.2%  63.7%  82.6%    56.0%  58.3%  69.6%  61.3%  73.9% 
market std.dev.    40.9%  41.4%  42.3%  41.5%  89.0%    40.9%  41.4%  42.3%  41.5%  89.0% 
glamour std.dev.    56.4%  45.1%  53.6%  51.7%  67.3%    48.4%  45.8%  47.0%  47.1%  84.4% 
value std.dev.    42.5%  46.1%  44.1%  44.2%  111.0%    49.4%  44.4%  46.7%  46.8%  86.6% 
Rm    25.8%  24.7%  24.2%  24.9%  82.6%    25.8%  24.7%  24.2%  24.9%  82.6% 
glamour 
underperformance    -23.7%  -29.6%  -19.3%  -24.2% 
-
104.9%    -25.3%  -30.6%  -27.1%  -27.6% 
-
102.3% 
value outperformance    -12.4%  -14.7%  -14.9%  -14.0%  -45.1%    -12.4%  -16.1%  -11.1%  -13.2%  -49.9% 
 
Notes: 
Beta-adjusted abnormal returns on simple CIS for 10 decile portfolios based on earnings-to-price ratio (E/P) and book-to-market ratio (B/M). Beta-adjusted 40 
     
abnormal returns are obtained as a difference between raw returns on a stock and the expected return on as stock based on CAPM. R1, R2, and R3 are annual 
returns in the first, second and third year after portfolio formation. AR3 is the average annual return (assuming annual portfolio rebalancing) for three years after 
the portfolio formation. CR3 shows the cumulative buy-and-hold return for three years after the portfolio formation. Rows 1 to 10 show the returns on individual 
decile portfolios. 10-1 and 9-2 show the value premium computed as returns on zero-investment consisting of short selling glamour portfolio 1 or 2 respectively 
and buying value portfolio 10 or 9 respectively. Success rate gives the annual frequency with which value portfolio 10 outperforms glamour portfolio 1, i.e. the 
proportion of years when the 10-1 value premium is positive. Market std.dev., glamour std.dev. and value std.dev. show standard deviation of returns for the 
market and for portfolios 1 and 10. Rm is the market return. Glamour underperformance (value outperformance) show the components of the value premium 




     
Table 5 
Dependence on Economic Conditions and Time 
 
Year  AFGX     g(GDP)     E/P                       B/M                      
               10-1     9-2     value     glamour      10 - 1     9 - 2     value     glamour     
Panel A - Individual Years 
1980  36.4%    1.7%    118.6%  *  26.6%    88.5%  *  -30.1%    102.9%  *  7.7%    80.3%  *  -22.6%   
  0.505    -0.255    2.405    0.629    3.446    -0.982    1.983    0.138    3.178    -0.622   
1981  30.0%    1.4%    23.9%    -15.7%    2.1%    -21.7%    -21.0%    23.9%    -8.3%    12.8%   
  0.306    -0.427    0.283    -0.632    -0.209    -0.664    -0.717    0.695    -0.656    0.626   
1982  92.2%  *  1.2%    55.7%    7.9%    12.3%    -43.4%    117.3%  *  27.8%    54.9%  *  -62.3%  * 
  2.239    -0.541    0.995    0.070    0.221    -1.485    2.296    0.826    2.078    -2.026   
1983  33.8%    1.8%    -9.7%    4.5%    16.2%    26.0%    46.2%    -20.0%    26.3%    -20.0%   
  0.426    -0.197    -0.470    -0.031    0.387    1.141    0.748    -0.810    0.838    -0.529   
1984  -18.6%    4.3%    23.4%    2.0%    12.5%    -10.9%    1.8%    20.7%    6.6%    4.8%   
  -1.203    1.236    0.272    -0.104    0.228    -0.256    -0.220    0.583    -0.015    0.345   
1985  48.2%    2.2%    23.6%    39.4%    10.5%    -13.1%    29.7%    5.1%    14.7%    -15.0%   
  0.872    0.032    0.276    1.011    0.144    -0.338    0.390    0.049    0.339    -0.355   
1986  31.6%    2.9%    -2.4%    -49.2%  *  -15.2%    -12.8%    -11.6%    -13.1%    -1.7%    9.9%   
  0.356    0.433    -0.307    -1.633    -0.943    -0.325    -0.512    -0.574    -0.373    0.525   
1987  4.6%    3.5%    -1.5%    -5.7%    5.8%    7.3%    18.1%    10.3%    9.4%    -8.6%   
  -0.484    0.777    -0.285    -0.334    -0.053    0.434    0.135    0.227    0.110    -0.130   
1988  42.8%    2.7%    9.9%    17.4%    10.6%    0.7%    22.5%    16.5%    18.7%    -3.8%   
  0.706    0.319    -0.031    0.354    0.150    0.186    0.232    0.441    0.511    0.042   
1989  1.2%    2.8%    2.4%    -7.6%    2.9%    0.5%    -7.3%    5.9%    -2.3%    5.0%   
  -0.590    0.376    -0.198    -0.393    -0.177    0.176    -0.417    0.077    -0.397    0.352   
1990  -4.2%    1.0%    12.7%    8.9%    5.1%    -7.5%    -14.3%    -7.4%    -8.2%    6.0%   
  -0.758    -0.656    0.031    0.102    -0.082    -0.126    -0.569    -0.379    -0.654    0.388   
1991  -8.6%    -1.1%  *  19.7%    14.0%    11.5%    -8.2%    -29.0%    -4.4%    -23.6%    5.4%   
  -0.892    -1.860    0.189    0.252    0.186    -0.152    -0.890    -0.277    -1.318    0.367   
1992  -0.5%    -1.2%  *  3.7%    0.9%    3.2%    -0.5%    -27.0%    5.9%    -11.1%    15.9%   
  -0.643    -1.917    -0.168    -0.139    -0.164    0.138    -0.847    0.077    -0.779    0.737   
1993  41.1%    -2.0%  *  19.6%    25.6%    -5.0%    -24.6%    35.9%    30.2%    -3.2%    -39.1%   
  0.653    -2.376    0.187    0.597    -0.509    -0.772    0.524    0.909    -0.435    -1.204   42 
     
1994  3.9%    3.9%    15.8%    8.9%    -6.5%    -22.3%    -11.9%    -12.1%    -1.0%    10.9%   
  -0.504    1.007    0.103    0.100    -0.575    -0.688    -0.518    -0.539    -0.343    0.559   
1995  29.9%    3.9%    -0.6%    0.0%    -3.9%    -3.3%    -13.9%    -16.1%    1.3%    15.2%   
  0.304    1.007    -0.267    -0.165    -0.465    0.034    -0.561    -0.677    -0.244    0.711   
1996  46.5%    1.3%    23.5%    34.1%    21.1%    -2.4%    -0.4%    6.3%    -7.2%    -6.8%   
  0.818    -0.484    0.275    0.851    0.594    0.067    -0.268    0.090    -0.611    -0.064   
1997  27.7%    2.3%    8.0%    3.3%    6.8%    -1.2%    0.0%    -10.5%    -2.8%    -2.8%   
  0.234    0.089    -0.073    -0.065    -0.013    0.112    -0.257    -0.485    -0.419    0.075   
1998  -1.1%    3.7%    -29.8%    -24.1%    -13.9%    15.9%    -29.5%    -1.4%    -7.0%    22.5%   
  -0.661    0.892    -0.921    -0.883    -0.890    0.760    -0.901    -0.173    -0.601    0.970   
1999  78.0%  *  4.5%    -150.1%  *  -113.4%  *  -50.5%  *  99.6%  *  -101.8%  *  -112.1%  *  -22.1%    79.6%  * 
  1.799    1.351    -3.616    -3.547    -2.439    3.929    -2.475    -3.964    -1.257    2.987   
2000  -36.9%  *  4.3%    50.6%    57.5%  *  26.5%    -24.1%    77.7%    43.5%    32.3%    -45.3%   
  -1.774    1.236    0.881    1.550    0.822    -0.753    1.434    1.365    1.101    -1.426   
2001  -0.8%    1.1%    48.3%    36.8%    29.1%    -19.3%    3.1%    13.6%    -5.2%    -8.3%   
  -0.651    -0.599    0.831    0.934    0.932    -0.571    -0.191    0.341    -0.523    -0.118   
2002  -40.3%  *  2.0%    39.2%    32.1%    22.7%    -16.5%    16.1%    18.3%    13.8%    -2.3%   
  -1.877    -0.083    0.626    0.793    0.662    -0.466    0.092    0.502    0.298    0.094   
2003  51.8%    1.7%    -11.6%    2.1%    -13.6%    -2.0%    48.5%    28.1%    -3.2%    -51.7%  * 
  0.984    -0.255    -0.513    -0.103    -0.877    0.082    0.798    0.836    -0.437    -1.649   
2004  14.8%    3.7%    -11.3%    31.9%    -1.8%    9.5%    44.5%    24.7%    21.0%    -23.6%   
  -0.167    0.892    -0.506    0.786    -0.377    0.518    0.711    0.722    0.609    -0.656   
mean  20.1%    2.1%    11.2%    5.5%    7.1%    -4.2%    11.9%    3.6%    6.9%    -5.0%   
mean outlier 
free  19.5%    2.6%    13.6%    11.1%    6.0%    -8.5%    8.1%    8.5%    1.6%    -4.1%   
                                         
Year  AFGX     g(GDP)     E/P Strategies                 B/M Strategies                
               10-1     9-2     value     glamour      10 - 1     9 - 2     value     glamour     
Panel B - Dependence on Stock Market Performance 
full sample  1.000    -0.005    -0.353    -0.381    -0.169    0.185    0.187    -0.292    0.119    -0.069   
      -0.437    -1.264    -1.885    -1.133    1.107    0.634    -1.628    0.802    -0.375   
Panel C - Dependence on GDP Growth 
full sample  -1.674    1.000    -8.057    -5.409    -2.860    5.197    -2.695    -4.388    1.799    4.494   
  -0.437        -1.591    -1.406    -1.036    1.752    -0.494    -1.303    0.657    1.381   43 
     
Panel D - Time Dependence 
full sample  -0.012    0.000    -0.020    0.004    -0.010    0.010    -0.015    -0.002    -0.012    0.003   
  -1.320    0.732    -1.716    0.376    -1.651    1.389    -1.149    -0.275    -1.975    0.321   
outlier free  -0.001    0.000    -0.002    0.005    0.000    0.004    0.011    0.004    -0.001    -0.003   
  -0.204    1.129    -0.343    1.012    0.064    0.988    1.216    0.920    -0.163    -0.537   
 
Notes: 
Value premiums and their components in individual years, their dependence on the market index return AFGX and on growth of gross domestic product, and 
their development over time. AFGX is the return on the Affars Varlden General Index from April to March of the following year (corresponding to portfolio 
holding periods). G(GDP) is the growth of Swedish gross domestic product in individual years. 10-1 and 9-2 show the value premium in the first year after 
portfolio formation computed as returns on zero-investment consisting of short selling glamour portfolio 1 or 2 respectively and buying value portfolio 10 or 9 
respectively. Glamour (value) show glamour underperformance and (value outperformance) components of value premium computed as the difference between 
the return on value portfolio 10 (glamour portfolio 1) and market return. Panel A shows the values for individual years. The numbers in italics below show the 
deviation of the annual value from its sample mean measured as standard deviations. Stars indicate outliers, i.e. observations more that 1.5 standard deviations 
from their mean. Panel A also shows the mean values for the entire sample and the mean value for the outlier free sample. Panel B shows the coefficients (with -
t-statistics in italics below) from time series regressions of individual variables on the market index AFGX. Panel C shows the coefficients (with t-statistics in 
italics below) from similar time series regressions of individual variables on the growth of gross domestic product. Panel D shows the coefficients (with t-
statistics in italics) from time series regressions of individual variables on the time variable. These results are presented for the entire sample as well as for the 
outlier free sample. 
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Table 6 
Combined Contrarian Strategies 
 
            E/P       
      R1  R2  R3  AR3  CR3 
Raw Returns on Combined Strategies Sorted on E/P and B/M 
glamour  11  25.5%  18.6%  18.9%  21.0%  69.1% 
  12  21.9%  19.9%  20.3%  20.7%  68.8% 
  13  22.5%  22.0%  20.6%  21.7%  73.3% 
  21  21.2%  18.8%  25.6%  21.9%  82.8% 
  22  22.3%  22.3%  21.8%  22.1%  73.4% 
  23  23.2%  27.1%  31.1%  27.2%  100.1% 
  31  26.9%  28.4%  25.7%  27.0%  96.3% 
  32  27.5%  25.4%  22.3%  25.1%  89.7% 
value  33  36.9%  31.2%  30.9%  33.0%  123.6% 
33-11    11.4%  12.5%  12.0%  12.0%  54.5% 
success rate    68.0%  62.5%  73.9%  68.1%  78.3% 
market std.dev.    40.9%  41.4%  42.3%  41.5%  89.0% 
glamour std.dev.    46.6%  46.9%  46.6%  46.7%  88.7% 
value std.dev.    48.2%  47.0%  43.6%  46.2%  125.9% 
Rm    25.8%  24.7%  24.2%  24.9%  82.6% 
glamour 
underperformance    -0.2%  -6.1%  -5.3%  -3.9%  -13.5% 
value outperformance    11.2%  6.4%  6.7%  8.1%  41.0% 
 
Notes: 
Raw returns on combined contrarian strategies that sort stocks into terciles on E/P and subsequently 
sub-sort each E/P terciles into sub-terciles based on B/M. R1, R2, and R3 are annual returns in the first, 
second and third year after portfolio formation. AR3 is the average annual return (assuming annual 
portfolio rebalancing) for three years after the portfolio formation. CR3 shows the cumulative buy-
and-hold return for three years after the portfolio formation. Rows 11, 12, 13, 21, 22, 23, 31, 32, and 
33 show returns on nine portfolios; the first digit in a portfolio label pertains to the E/P tercile and the 
second to B/M sub-tercile. Portfolio 11 in glamour portfolio and portfolio 33 is value portfolio. 33-11 
shows the value premium computed as returns on zero-investment consisting of short selling glamour 
portfolio 11 and buying value portfolio 33. Success rate gives the annual frequency with which value 
portfolio  33 outperforms  glamour  portfolio  11,  i.e.  the proportion  of  years  when the  33-11  value 
premium is positive. Market std.dev., glamour std.dev. and value std.dev. show standard deviation of 
returns  for  the  market  and  for  portfolios  11  and  33.  Rm  is  the  market  return.  Glamour 
underperformance (value outperformance) show the components of the value premium computed as 
the difference between the return on value portfolio 33 (glamour portfolio 11) and market return. 45 
     
Table 7 
Median Industry Volatility of Earnings 
 
   industry  firms  firm-years  md(iECV)   half 
Median Industry Earnings Volatility over the Entire Sample Period 
16  Chemical  10  107  0.660  1 
17  High-tech development  17  130  0.719  1 
12  Consumer manufacturing  40  381  0.883  1 
11  Industrial manufacturing  102  1142  0.968  1 
26  Medical technology  12  102  0.976  1 
13  Industrial development and prospecting  19  152  1.049  1 
24  Miscellaneous  24  183  1.074  1 
34  Real estate  63  585  1.174  1 
31  Mixed investment company  50  562  1.239  2 
15  Trading  43  435  1.244  2 
25  Pharmaceuticals  3  36  1.254  2 
19  Other production  18  274  1.371  2 
23  Transportation  21  243  1.398  2 
18  Building and construction  28  386  1.426  2 
14  Raw materials and forestry  31  359  1.487  2 
22  IT services (including consulting)  64  471  1.548  2 
33  Other services  14  113  1.890  2 
21  Consulting (excluding IT)  20  176  1.926  2 
20  Services (excluding consulting and IT)  23  169  2.061  2 
  Stable industries (half 1)  287  2782     
  Volatile industries (half 2)  315  3224     
  Total  602  6006     
 
Notes: 
Median  industry  volatility  of  earnings  computed  over  the  entire  sample  period.  Firms  shows  the 
number of stocks in each industry and firm-years is the number of firm-year observations for each 
industry during the entire sample period. Md(iECV)  is the industry median coefficient of variation of 
earnings. For each company we calculate the coefficient of variation of its earnings over its entire 
existence  in  the  sample  and  then  we  compute  the  median  of  coefficient  of  variation  within  each 
industry.  Half  classifies  industries  into  stable  (1)  and  volatile  (2)  based  on  the  industry  median 
coefficient of variation of earnings. 46 
     
Table 8 
Contrarian Strategies in Stable and Volatile Industries 
 
            E/P       
      R1  R2  R3  AR3  CR3 
Panel A - Stable Industries 
∆ 10 −1    5.5%  -4.3%  11.5%  4.2%  -4.4% 
∆ 9 − 2    9.2%  7.7%  -4.4%  4.2%  6.6% 
∆ success rate    4.0%  -4.2%  17.4%  5.7%  -13.0% 
Panel B - Volatile Industries 
∆ 10 −1    -6.7%  -1.0%  -14.7%  -7.5%  -21.7% 
∆ 9 − 2    -5.8%  5.4%  7.3%  2.3%  26.0% 
∆ success rate    -16.0%  -8.3%  -13.0%  -12.5%  -17.4% 
Panel C - Volatile Industries Sub-Divided for Cyclical Industries 
∆ 10 −1    -4.8%  1.5%  -9.1%  -4.1%  -1.5% 
∆ 9 − 2    -2.2%  5.7%  0.5%  1.3%  9.1% 
∆ success rate    -16.0%  0.0%  -4.3%  -6.8%  -13.0% 
 
Notes: 
Incremental value premium and incremental success rate of E/P contrarian strategies performed within 
stable and volatile industries. Panel A shows results for stable industries (classified as 1 in Table 7), 
Panel B shows results for volatile industries (classified as 2 in Table 7), and Panel C shows results for 
volatile industries when the industries whose volatility is pegged to GDP growth are sorted separately. 
R1, R2, and R3 are annual returns in the first, second, and third year after portfolio formation. AR3 is 
the average annual return (assuming annual portfolio rebalancing) for three years after the portfolio 
formation. CR3 shows the cumulative buy-and-hold return for three years after the portfolio formation. 
∆ 10-1 and ∆ 9-2 show the incremental value premiums computed as the difference between value 
premiums earned on stable or volatile industries and the value premium of the benchmark strategy (i.e. 
simple E/P strategy). Positive incremental value premium indicates an increase in value premium in 
comparison  with  the  benchmark  strategy.  ∆  success  rate  shows  the  change  in  the  success  rate 
(measured as a proportion of years with positive value premium) in comparison with the benchmark 
strategy.  47 
     
Table 9 
Contrarian Strategies for Historically Stable and Volatile Companies 
 
            E/P       
      R1  R2  R3  AR3  CR3 
Panel A - Historically Stable Companies 
∆ 10 −1    -0.3%  -1.1%  8.1%  2.2%  1.2% 
∆ 9 − 2    8.1%  1.4%  2.1%  3.9%  24.9% 
∆ success rate    4.3%  0.0%  23.8%  9.4%  -19.0% 
Panel B - Historically Volatile Companies 
∆ 10 −1    -4.3%  4.7%  -9.9%  -3.1%  -21.8% 
∆ 9 − 2    2.1%  1.6%  -4.1%  -0.1%  19.1% 
∆ success rate    -4.3%  -13.6%  4.8%  -4.4%  -23.8% 
 
Notes: 
Incremental value premium and incremental success rate of E/P contrarian strategies performed within 
historically stable and volatile companies. Panel A shows results for companies with historically stable 
earnings (in past 5 years); Panel B shows results for companies with historically volatile earnings. R1, 
R2, and R3 are annual returns in the first, second and third year after portfolio formation. AR3 is the 
average  annual  return  (assuming  annual  portfolio  rebalancing)  for  three  years  after  the  portfolio 
formation. CR3 shows the cumulative buy-and-hold return for three years after the portfolio formation. 
∆ 10-1 and ∆ 9-2 show the incremental value premiums computed as the difference between value 
premiums earned on stable or volatile companies and the value premium of the benchmark strategy 
(i.e. simple E/P strategy fulfilling the criteria of data availability for computation of coefficient of 
variation in earnings). Positive incremental value premium indicates an increase in value premium in 
comparison  with  the  benchmark  strategy.  ∆  success  rate  shows  the  change  in  the  success  rate 
(measured as a proportion of years with positive value premium) in comparison with the benchmark 
strategy.  48 
     
Table 10 
Contrarian Strategies Based on Sustainable Earnings 
 
            sE/P       
      R1  R2  R3  AR3  CR3 
Panel A -  sE/P Strategy Based on Median Company ROA 
∆ 10 −1    -4.0%  -1.6%  12.1%  2.1%  -17.3% 
∆ 9 − 2    2.4%  9.6%  1.1%  4.4%  26.4% 
∆ success rate    -13.0%  -4.5%  28.6%  3.7%  -4.8% 
Panel B -  sE/P Strategy Based on Median Industry ROA 
∆ 10 −1    -5.0%  2.6%  10.6%  2.7%  16.4% 
∆ 9 − 2    9.2%  9.3%  -1.6%  5.6%  19.2% 
∆ success rate    4.3%  0.0%  28.6%  11.0%  4.8% 
 
Notes: 
Incremental  value  premium  and  incremental  success  rate  of  sE/P  contrarian  strategies  based  on 
sustainable earnings-to-price ratio. In Panel A the sustainable earnings are estimated by multiplying 
historical median company return on assets over past 5 years, i.e. mn(cROA) with total assets at the 
end of the accounting year. In Panel A the sustainable earnings are estimated by multiplying historical 
median industry return on assets over past 5 years, i.e. mn(iROA) with total company assets at the end 
of the accounting year. R1, R2, and R3 are annual returns in the first, second and third year after 
portfolio formation. AR3 is the average annual return (assuming annual portfolio rebalancing) for three 
years after the portfolio formation. CR3 shows the cumulative buy-and-hold return for three years after 
the portfolio formation. ∆ 10-1 and ∆ 9-2 show the incremental value premiums computed as the 
difference between value premiums earned on sE/P strategy and the value premium of the benchmark 
strategy (i.e. simple E/P strategy fulfilling the criteria of data availability for computation of company 
or industry ROA). Positive incremental value premium indicates an increase in value premium in 
comparison  with  the  benchmark  strategy.  ∆  success  rate  shows  the  change  in  the  success  rate 
(measured as a proportion of years with positive value premium) in comparison with the benchmark 
strategy.  49 
     
Table 11 
Median Industry B/M 
 
   industry  firms  firm-years  md(i(B/M))  half 
Median Industry B/M over the Entire Sample Period 
17  High-tech development  17  130  0.293  1 
25  Pharmaceuticals  3  36  0.296  1 
20  Services (excluding consulting and IT)  23  169  0.304  1 
13  Industrial development and prospecting  19  152  0.317  1 
22  IT services (including consulting)  64  471  0.327  1 
21  Consulting (excluding IT)  20  176  0.341  1 
26  Medical technology  12  102  0.345  1 
15  Trading  43  435  0.396  1 
11  Industrial manufacturing  102  1142  0.450  1 
33  Other services  14  113  0.460  2 
12  Consumer manufacturing  40  381  0.477  2 
19  Other production  18  274  0.485  2 
18  Building and construction  28  386  0.491  2 
24  Miscellaneous  24  183  0.517  2 
31  Mixed investment company  50  562  0.589  2 
14  Raw materials and forestry  31  359  0.654  2 
16  Chemical  10  107  0.668  2 
34  Real estate  63  585  0.680  2 
23  Transportation  21  243  0.928  2 
  Low B/M industries (half 1)  303  2813     
  High B/M industries (half 2)  299  3193     
  Total  602  6006     
 
Notes: 
Median industry B/M multiple computed over the entire sample period. Firms shows the number of 
stocks  in  each  industry  and  firm-years  is  the  number  of  firm-year  observations  for  each  industry 
during the entire sample period. Md(i(B/M)) is the median industry book-to-market multiple. We first 
compute the median B/M for each company over its entire existence in the sample; then industry B/M 
is calculated as the median of all company median B/M ratios belonging to that particular industry. 
Half classifies industries into low B/M (1) and high B/M (2) based on the median industry book-to-
market multiple. 50 
     
Table 12 
Contrarian Strategies Pre-Sorted for High B/M and Low B/M Industries 
 
            B/M       
      R1  R2  R3  AR3  CR3 
B/M Strategy Pre-Sorted for Sample-Wide Median Industry B/M 
∆ 10 −1    3.8%  2.8%  3.3%  3.3%  16.3% 
∆ 9 − 2    2.3%  4.3%  -7.4%  -0.3%  -5.2% 
∆ success rate    8.0%  12.5%  8.7%  9.7%  13.0% 
 
Notes: 
Incremental value premium and incremental success rate of B/M contrarian strategies pre-sorted for 
industries with high vs. low B/M measured over the entire sample period. We first divide industries 
into approximate halves based on their average level of B/M, and then we sort to decile portfolios 
within each half. R1, R2, and R3 are annual returns in the first, second and third year after portfolio 
formation. AR3 is the average annual return (assuming annual portfolio rebalancing) for three years 
after the portfolio formation. CR3 shows the cumulative buy-and-hold return for three years after the 
portfolio  formation.  ∆  10-1  and  ∆  9-2  show  the  incremental  value  premiums  computed  as  the 
difference between value premiums earned on the pre-sorted strategy and the value premium on the 
benchmark  strategy  (i.e.  simple  B/M  strategy).  Positive  incremental  value  premium  indicates  an 
increase in value premium in comparison with the benchmark strategy. ∆ success  rate  shows the 
change  in  the  success  rate  (measured  as  a  proportion  of  years  with  positive  value  premium)  in 
comparison with the benchmark strategy.  51 
     
Table 13 
Contrarian Strategies Pre-Sorted for Historically High B/M and Low B/M Industries 
 
            B/M       
      R1  R2  R3  AR3  CR3 
B/M Strategy Pre-Sorted for Historical Median Industry B/M 
∆ 10 −1    0.1%  0.1%  1.2%  0.5%  5.7% 
∆ 9 − 2    3.3%  1.6%  -1.2%  1.2%  -7.0% 
∆ success rate    4.3%  0.0%  0.0%  1.4%  0.0% 
 
Notes: 
Incremental value premium and incremental success rate of B/M contrarian strategies pre-sorted for 
industries with the history of high vs. low B/M measured over past 5 years. We first divide industries 
into approximate halves based on their average level of B/M in past 5 years, and then we sort to decile 
portfolios within each half. R1, R2, and R3 are annual returns in the first, second and third year after 
portfolio formation. AR3 is the average annual return (assuming annual portfolio rebalancing) for three 
years after the portfolio formation. CR3 shows the cumulative buy-and-hold return for three years after 
the portfolio formation. ∆ 10-1 and ∆ 9-2 show the incremental value premiums computed as the 
difference between value premiums earned on the pre-sorted strategy and the value premium on the 
benchmark strategy (i.e. simple B/M strategy fulfilling the condition of at least 3 year B/M history). 
Positive incremental value premium indicates an increase in value premium in comparison with the 
benchmark strategy. ∆ success rate shows the change in the success rate (measured as a proportion of 
years with positive value premium) in comparison with the benchmark strategy.  52 
     
Table 14 
Permanent Measurement Bias 
 
   industry  firms     match  PMB 
Panel A - Permanent Measurement Bias 
      101  Pharmaceuticals  1.74 
      102  Capital-intensive service  0.76 
      103  Consumer goods  0.72 
      104  Investment companies  0.68 
      105  Pulp & paper  0.67 
      106  Shipping  0.65 
      107  Other service  0.62 
      108  Consultants & computer  0.59 
      109  Real Estate  0.56 
      110  Mixed building & real estate  0.55 
      111  Trading & retail  0.47 
      112  Chemical industry  0.44 
      113  Building & construction  0.48 
      114  Engineering  0.33 
      115  Other production  0.31 
      116  Conglomerate & mix. inv.  0.28 
        Median  0.58 
     
Panel B - Matching of Runsten's Industry Classifications 
11  Industrial manufacturing  102  114  Engineering  0.33 
12  Consumer manufacturing  40  103  Consumer goods  0.72 
13  Industrial development and prospecting  19  114  Engineering  0.33 
14  Raw materials and forestry  31  105  Pulp & paper  0.67 
15  Trading  43  111  Trading & retail  0.47 
16  Chemical  10  112  Chemical industry  0.44 
17  High-tech development  17  108  Consultants & computer  0.59 
18  Building and construction  28  113  Building & construction  0.48 
19  Other production  18  115  Other production  0.31 
20  Services (excluding consulting and IT)  23  107  Other service  0.62 
21  Consulting (excluding IT)  20  108  Consultants & computer  0.59 
22  IT services (including consulting)  64  108  Consultants & computer  0.59 
23  Transportation  21  106  Shipping  0.65 
24  Miscellaneous  24  107  Other service  0.62 
25  Pharmaceuticals  3  101  Pharmaceuticals  1.74 
26  Medical technology  12  114  Engineering  0.33 
31  Mixed investment company  50  104  Investment companies  0.68 
33  Other services  14  102  Capital-intensive service  0.76 
34  Real estate  63  109  Real Estate  0.56 
  Total  602       
 
Notes: 
Panel A shows the permanent measurement bias (PMB) estimated by Runsten (1998). Panel B shows 
the  matching  of  Runsten’s  (1998)  industry  classification  with  industry  classification  used  by  the 
authors.  Industry  pertains  to  industry  classification  used  by  the  authors,  while  match  shows  the 53 
     
matched industry reported by Runsten (1998). 54 
     
Table 15 
Contrarian Strategies Based on Unbiased Book Value of Equity 
 
            uB/M       
      R1  R2  R3  AR3  CR3 
uB/M Strategy Based on Runsten's PMB 
∆ 10 −1    1.2%  2.6%  1.5%  1.7%  6.8% 
∆ 9 − 2    1.0%  -4.8%  -5.4%  -3.1%  -19.5% 
∆ success rate    0.0%  8.3%  0.0%  2.8%  8.7% 
 
Notes: 
Incremental  value  premium  and  incremental  success  rate  of  uB/M  contrarian  strategies  based  on 
‘unbiased’ book value of equity to market value of equity ratio. To estimate the ‘unbiased’ book value 
of  equity  (uB)  we  multiply  the  book  value  of  equity  by  (1  +  PMB)  where  PMB  is  the  industry 
permanent measurement bias reported by Runsten (1998). R1, R2, and R3 are annual returns in the 
first, second and third year after portfolio formation. AR3 is the average annual return (assuming 
annual portfolio rebalancing) for three years after the portfolio formation. CR3 shows the cumulative 
buy-and-hold  return  for  three  years  after  the  portfolio  formation.  ∆  10-1  and  ∆  9-2  show  the 
incremental value premiums computed as the difference between value premiums earned on uB/M 
strategy  and  the  value  premium  of  the  benchmark  strategy  (i.e.  simple  B/M  strategy).  Positive 
incremental value premium indicates an increase in value premium in comparison with the benchmark 
strategy. ∆ success rate shows the change in the success rate (measured as a proportion of years with 
positive value premium) in comparison with the benchmark strategy.  
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Appendix 
Paper  Market  Time  Findings  Interpretation 
De Bondt, W. F. M. and R. Thaler (1985), 
'Does  the  Stock  Market  Overreact?' 





1926 - 1982  Past  losers  (stocks  with  low  past  returns) 
outperform  in  the  future  past  winners.  The 
superior  losers’  performance  starts  to 
materialize  only  after  the  first  year  after  the 
formation. 
Authors  use  the  overreaction  hypothesis  to 
explain their results. They suggest that losers 
outperform  winners  because  investors 
overreact to a series of good (bad) news and 
bid up winners’ (losers’) stock price too high 
(low). 
Davidson Iii, W. N. and D. Dutia (1989), 
'A  Note  on  the  Behavior  of  Security 
Returns:  A  Test  of  Stock  Market 
Overreaction  and  Efficiency',  Journal  of 
Financial  Research,  Vol.  12,  No.  3,  pp. 
245-252. 
U.S.  1963 - 1985  The paper provides evidence on momentum in 
stock  prices.  Stocks  with  high  abnormal 
returns  in  past  year  continue  to  have  high 
returns in the following year. 
The author argues that these findings are not 
consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. 
De Long, J. B., A. Shleifer, L. H. Summers 
and R. J. Waldmann (1990), 'Noise Trader 
Risk  in  Financial  Markets',  Journal  of 
Political Economy, Vol. 98, No. 4, pp. 703. 
---  ---  Analytical paper presenting a model involving 
noise  traders  with  erroneous  beliefs. 
Unpredictability of these beliefs creates extra 
risk  for  rational  arbitrageurs,  which  makes 
arbitrage  incomplete,  i.e.  mispricing  may 
persist.  Creating  this  extra  risk  makes  it 
possible for noise traders to earn higher returns 
than arbitrageurs. 
This  analytical  model  predicts  the  stock 
returns patterns that can be exploited with the 
CIS. 
Pettengill, G. N. and B. D. Jordan (1990), 
'The Overreaction  Hypothesis,  Firm  Size, 
and Stock Market Seasonality', Journal of 
Portfolio Management, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 
60-64. 
U.S.    The  price  reversals  are  found  to  be  more 
significant  for  past  losers  than  for  past 
winners. Size is documented as an important 
conditioning variable as the reversals are more 
characteristic  for  stock  performance  of  large 
firms.  
The  authors  argue  that  the  overreaction 
hypothesis may be conditional on firm size as 
well as market seasonality. 56 
     
Lakonishok,  J.,  A.  Shleifer  and  R.  W. 
Vishny  (1994),  'Contrarian  Investment, 
Extrapolation,  and  Risk',  Journal  of 
Finance, Vol. 49, No. 5, pp. 1541-1578. 
U.S.  1968 - 1990  Value stocks outperform glamour stocks for 5 
years after the portfolio formation (the value 
premium  gradually  disappears  in  year  4  and 
5); value stocks are not fundamentally riskier 
as they yield high returns in the bad states of 
the economy. 
The  authors  argue  that  the  value  stock 
outperformance exists because the implied rate 
of growth of earnings are too high compared to 
the  actual  future  rates,  hence  investor  over 
extrapolate past growth rates. 
La  Porta,  R.,  J.  Lakonishok,  A.  Shleifer 
and R. W. Vishny (1997), 'Good News for 
Value Stocks: Further Evidence on Market 
Efficiency',  Journal  of  Finance,  Vol.  52, 
No. 2, pp. 859-874. 
U.S.  1971 - 1993  Returns  around  earnings  announcements  are 
substantially higher for value stocks than for 
glamour stock, which indicates that investors 
are  consistently  surprised  by  better-than-
expected performance of value stocks. 
The  authors  interpret  their  findings  as  direct 
evidence on the importance of the expectation 
errors  for  the  superior  returns  earned  on 
accounting-based contrarian strategies. 
Conrad, J., M. Cooper and G. Kaul (2003), 
'Value  Versus  Glamour',  Journal  of 
Finance, Vol. 58, No. 5, pp. 1969-1996. 
U.S.  1965 - 1995  Experimental  paper  showing  data  snooping 
may account up till 50% of the returns related 
to company characteristics. 
The authors argue that these results arise due 
to  the familiarity  of the  research  community 
with  the  U.S.  data  and  imply  the  need  for 
international studies. 
Jiang, X. and M. Zaman (2007), 'Aggregate 
Insider  Trading  and  the  Predictability  of 
Market  Returns:  Contrarian  Strategy  or 
Managerial  Timing?'  SSRN  eLibrary 
(SSRN). 
U.S.  1975 - 2000  Insider trading has a strong predictive power 
and  it  is  primarily  related  to  the  unexpected 
cash flow new rather than to aggregate market 
expectations. 
The  predictive  power  of  insider  trading  for 
stock returns is caused by managerial timing 
rather than contrarian investment strategy. 
Chan,  L.  K.  C.,  Y.  Hamao  and  J. 
Lakonishok  (1991),  'Fundamentals  and 
Stock  Returns  in  Japan',  Journal  of 
Finance, Vol. 46, No. 5, pp. 1739. 
Japan  1971 - 1988  Substantial relation between stock returns and 
earnings yield, size, book to market ratio, and 
cash flow yield. 
The authors do not take a stance on whether 
their results are generated by irrational market 
overreaction  of  the  correlation  of  the 
accounting  variables  to  the  underlying  risk 
proxies. 
Cai,  J.  (1997),  'Glamour  and  Value 
Strategies on the Tokyo Stock Exchange', 
Journal  of  Business  Finance  & 
Accounting, Vol. 24, No. 9/10, pp. 1291. 
Japan  1971 -1994  Substantial  returns  on  contrarian  investment 
strategies  documented  on  all  standard 
measures. 
The  authors  refute  the  risk  argument  after 
deploying  the  conventional  risk  proxies  and 
conclude  that  the  extrapolation  bias  is  the 
likely explanation of the documented patterns. 57 
     
 
Brouwer,  I.  and  J.  Van  Der  Put  (1997), 
'Contrarian  Investment  Strategies  in  a 
European  Context',  Journal  of  Business 






1982 - 1993  Contrarian strategies based on E/P, B/M, CF/P 
and  dividend  yield  all  generate  substantial 
abnormal return. 
By  comparing  the  performance  of  value  and 
glamour strategies in  good and  bad states of 
the  economy,  the  authors  argue  that  the 
difference  in  returns  cannot  be  explained  by 
higher  risk  of  value  stocks.  They  propose 
individual  investors’  biases  as  well  as  fund 
managers’  incentive  schemes  as  likely 
explanations for the documented patterns. 
Gregory,  A.,  R.  D.  F.  Harris  and  M. 
Michou (2001), 'An Analysis of Contrarian 
Investment Strategies in the U.K.' Journal 
of  Business  Finance  &  Accounting,  Vol. 
28, No. 9/10, pp. 1192. 
U.K.  1975 - 1998  Significant abnormal returns both for one-way 
and  two-way  sorted  stocks  documented 
(persistent  even  after  controlling  for  size). 
Returns from  one-way  sort can  be explained 
by  Fama,  French  (1996)  3-factor  model,  but 
the two-way sorts cannot. 
Higher returns earned on contrarian strategies 
cannot  be  fully  explained  by  Fama,  French 
(1996)  3-factor  model;  hence  they  seem  to 
arise  (at  least  partly)  due  to  sub-optimal 
investor behavior. 
Chin,  J.  Y.  F.,  A.  K.  Prevost  and  A.  A. 
Gottesman (2002), 'Contrarian Investing in 
a  Small  Capitalization  Market:  Evidence 
from  New  Zealand',  Financial  Review, 
Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 421. 
New 
Zealand 
1986 - 1996  Value portfolios underperform during the first 
year after portfolio formation but outperform 
glamour portfolios in the subsequent periods. 
The  authors  attribute  this  pattern  to 
expectation errors caused by noise trading in 
the  relatively  illiquid  market.  The  illiquidity 
delays the correction of the expectation errors. 
CIS then require longer horizon to pay off. 
Forner,  C.  and  J.  Marhuenda  (2003), 
'Contrarian  and  Momentum  Strategies  in 
the  Spanish  Stock  Market',  European 
Financial Management, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 
67-88. 
Spain  1963 - 1997  Positive  momentum  returns  exist  in  the 
Spanish  market  for  the  6-month  period  and 
positive contrarian returns exist for the 3-year 
period.  Provides  additional  evidence 
suggesting  that  previously  documented 
momentum and contrarian returns are not due 
to data snooping. 
The  authors  suggest  the  overreaction 
hypothesis as the explanation for their results, 
i.e.  delayed  incorporation  of  information  to 
prices  (creating  the  momentum)  that 
eventually overshoots the price level leading to 
a  subsequent  correction  (which  creates  the 
opportunity for the contrarian strategy).   
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